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ABSTRACT 
  Agencies can change society not just by prescribing conduct, but 
also by spending money. The Obama administration gave us two 
powerful examples of this phenomenon. To secure widespread access 
to affordable health insurance and affordable higher education, the 
administration took actions that were not required by statutory text. 
These entitlements are built upon a scaffolding of aggressive agency 
statutory interpretations, not upon clear legislative commands.  
  This Article uses these two examples as case studies for evaluating 
the institutional competence of the executive branch to underwrite 
large-scale positive economic entitlements on the basis of ambiguous 
statutory authority. Such agency-initiated schemes may help improve 
the economic wellbeing and enhance the economic opportunity of 
Copyright © 2017 Mila Sohoni. 
† Associate Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. For enlightening comments 
and conversations, many thanks to Kate Andrias, Sam Bagenstos, Nick Bagley, Jordan Barry, 
John Brooks, Laurie Claus, Scott Dodson, Chris Egleson, Dov Fox, Andy Grewal, Tara Leigh 
Grove, Kristin Hickman, Allison Hoffman, Anita Krishnakumar, Dave Owen, Daryl Levinson, 
David McGowan, Nina Mendelson, Gillian Metzger, Jon Michaels, Eloise Pasachoff, David 
Pozen, Zach Price, Michael Ramsey, Richard Re, Daphna Renan, Keith Sharfman, Reuel 
Schiller, Miriam Seifter, Kate Shaw, Jodi Short, Ted Sichelman, Norman Spaulding, Karen Tani, 
Chas Tyler, Ray Warner, Adam Zimmerman, and to the students in my Fall 2016 seminar on 
Health Care Reform. I am grateful to participants in the AALS’s 2017 New Voices in 
Administrative Law event, the Ninth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop, and to 
the faculty workshops of the St. John’s University School of Law, the U.C. Hastings College of 
Law, the UCLA School of Law, and the University of San Diego School of Law. I am deeply 
indebted to the student organizers of the Duke Law Journal’s 47th Annual Administrative Law 
Symposium and to the team of wonderful Duke Law Journal editors who worked on this Article, 
and I owe special thanks to Amalea Romero for her able research assistance, and to the 
University of San Diego for supporting this project with a generous summer research grant. 
SOHONI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2017  1:12 PM 
1678  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1677 
millions of Americans. But, as these case studies reflect, the risks of 
such agency action are considerable. First, when the executive branch 
gives money away, Article III standing requirements will weaken the 
check of judicial review on administrative action. Second, agency 
creation of schemes for protecting economic entitlements may result in 
political and even legal entrenchment that could complicate or obstruct 
future lawmakers’ ability to undo those agency decisions. Third, the 
initiation of broad-scale government spending programs entails 
society-wide redistributive trade-offs that neither individual agencies, 
nor the executive branch as a whole, can properly make. In sum, this 
form of executive-branch action may advance important interests—
interests in health, education, and economic equality and opportunity. 
But it may also corrode values that are at least equally important—most 
notably, the power of Congress to control the current and future 
financial obligations of the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A long line of constitutional law scholars has pressed the case that 
the Constitution protects judicially enforceable economic rights, such 
as the rights to education, health care, and welfare.1 Other scholars 
 
 1. See generally, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004) (arguing for 
reforms that would vindicate social and economic rights); Susan Bitensky, Theoretical 
Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the 
National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550 (1992) (arguing for the recognition of education 
as an affirmative right); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to 
Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525 (1993) (advocating for a constitutional right to 
minimal entitlements); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate 
Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013) (arguing that there is a federal constitutional right 
to education); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the 
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have sharply criticized the idea that courts should treat the 
Constitution as conferring substantive guarantees to economic goods.2 
All participants in this debate generally agree, however, that “the 
political branches”—that is, Congress and the executive branch—can 
together create and protect entitlements to economic goods via 
statutory lawmaking without generating the separation-of-powers or 
institutional-choice worries of the kind that would be provoked if 
courts undertook this task. Professor Frank Cross, for example, while 
arguing that the judiciary should not create positive rights through 
constitutional law, called “[t]he notion of positive statutory 
rights . . . utterly unexceptionable.”3  
At the federal level, American law has largely heeded the 
concerns of the critics, and has left the creation of economic rights to 
the political branches.4 Over the last century, Congress has created 
myriad “utterly unexceptionable” legislative schemes to shield 
economic rights, among them Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, 
and has enlisted myriad federal agencies to carry out these schemes.5 
 
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (arguing that economic 
inequality is not in itself unconstitutional, but that the courts should intervene to protect the poor 
from the hazards that accompany economic inequality); Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care Act, 
the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes, and the Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional 
Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639, 1688 & n.241 (2012) (collecting nearly a dozen examples 
of literature arguing in favor of recognition of positive constitutional rights). Cf. Joseph Fishkin 
& William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 669, 695–96 (2014) 
(“Extreme concentrations of economic and political power undermine equal citizenship and equal 
opportunity.”); Jon D. Michaels, Note, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican 
Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457, 1459 (2002) (arguing that 
“welfare rights should be protected as citizenship rights”).  
 2. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 900 (2001); 
see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal 
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133−35, 1155, 1175−83 (1999) (reviewing barriers 
to judicial enforcement of welfare rights)  
 3. Cross,  note 2, at 861 [t]here is an indisputable 
statutory right to receive payments under the Earned Income Tax Credit, for example, assuming 
one meets the statutory conditions and at least until its statutory authority is revoked,” and that 
“proponents of positive rights argue for something more[:] a right of constitutional magnitude 
that compels the legislature to create and implement programs such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit.” Id  
 4. See Daryl Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in 
Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 133 (2016) (noting that courts have “shunn[ed] the possibility 
of casting rights as positive, redistributive claims to social and economic goods”); Michaels, supra 
note 1, at 1472–78 (tracing case law that dealt the “deathblow” to the “welfare-as-property 
movement”); cf. Hershkoff, supra note 2, passim (discussing counterexamples from state 
constitutional law concerning economic rights). 
 5. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) today plays an increasingly important role. Kristin 
E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 
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Meanwhile, although the federal courts have imposed procedural due 
process protections on such rights,6 they have stayed away from 
articulating substantive protections for them7—to the deep 
dissatisfaction of some and the certain relief of others. 
But the political branches do not always speak with one voice. In 
the arena of health insurance, agencies under the Obama 
administration took important steps—steps that arguably exceeded 
statutory authority—to spend money to keep premiums low and plans 
affordable in the years following the enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).8 In the arena of higher 
education, agencies under the Obama administration took steps—
again, steps arguably in excess of statutory authority—to ease the 
burden of debt borne by recipients of federal loans for higher 
education.9 Through these efforts, the executive branch helped to 
secure rights10 that are both vertical—in that they are funded by the 
government11—and economic—in that they deliver goods that are 
fungible with direct cash transfers.12 In a nutshell, the executive branch 
 
68–69 (“[T]he IRS is now one of the government’s principal welfare agencies, on par with the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Social Security Administration.”). 
 6. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1973, 1973 (1996) (noting that between 1970 and 1972, “the Court expanded dramatically 
the scope of the interests that are protected by procedural due process and the procedural 
safeguards that apply to those interests”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public 
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1207 (1982) (“A statute creates a 
constitutionally protected ‘property’ entitlement if it limits the discretion of administrative 
officials so as to mandate the provision of a benefit to those meeting specified terms.”).  
 7. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (“We must conclude that a person covered 
by the Act has not such a right in benefit payments as would make every defeasance of ‘accrued’ 
interests violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 8. See infra Part I.A. 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. I use the term “right” in a pragmatic and shallow sense, to mean “a legal entitlement,” 
regardless of whether that entitlement is grounded in nonconstitutional positive law (statute or 
regulation) or in constitutional law. See SUNSTEIN, , at 203 (treating, for definitional 
purposes, rights as “instruments for protecting important human interests” while bracketing 
foundational or theoretical questions about the origins of rights) (emphasis omitted)). 
 11. Borrowing from Professor Stephen Gardbaum, I use the term “vertical” to denote rights 
that are either provided in kind by the government or supported by subsidies from the 
government. Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 387, 388 (2003) (distinguishing constitutional rights that “regulate only the conduct of 
governmental actors in their dealings with private individuals (vertical)” from those that regulate 
“relations between private individuals (horizontal)”). 
 12. I use the term “economic” to refer to rights to things that are either actually cash or could 
be substituted with a direct cash transfer—such as health care, education, or a minimum income—
as opposed to civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech or the right to cast a vote, 
which are neither cash nor fungible with cash. To have a “right” to an economic good does not 
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committed to spending billions of government dollars so that millions 
of Americans could access affordable health insurance and affordable 
higher education. 
These executive-branch actions were neither narrow nor 
nugatory. Rather, they were “broad-gauged” and systematic efforts to 
reform entire “patterns of distribution—of access, opportunity, and so 
on—affecting society as a whole.”13 These measures have furthered 
important, arguably fundamental, human interests—in health, 
education, financial security,14 and economic opportunity15—that a 
venerable tradition of reformers have sought to secure for all 
Americans.16 Courts could have conceivably attempted to protect these 
interests through constitutional adjudication, but they have not. 
Instead, in both instances, these interests received protection from the 
executive branch, not the judiciary or the legislature, and from the use 
of executive-branch tools—statutory interpretation in the service of 
agency spending decisions—rather than from constitutional judgments 
or clear legislative commands. 
Such executive-branch-driven spending schemes are an 
understudied aspect of administrative law. Recent scholarship on 
mechanisms of agency self-funding,17 agency control over monetary 
 
entail that the government provide that good in kind to beneficiaries; instead, like the “right to a 
minimum wage,” an economic right might be supported by restrictions on private parties. 
Alternatively, or in addition, it might be supported by subsidies to suppliers, as is the case with 
the “right to affordable housing” that has been promoted by various federal housing laws dating 
back to the New Deal. Obviously, not everyone uses the term “economic” in the same way. See, 
e.g., Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 893, 895 & n.6 (2014) (calling “[t]he right 
to purchase health insurance at affordable costs” a “civil right” and stating that the ACA “rests 
squarely, if implicitly, on a civil right to health care”).  
13 Frank I. Michelman, The Unbearable Lightness of Tea Leaves: Constitutional Political 
Economy in Court, 94 TEX. L. REV. 101, 103 (2016) (noting that Forbath and Fishkin’s proposed 
constitutional norm is “ultimately concerned not with particularized claims from discrete 
individuals or groups to preferred or advantageous treatment, but rather with broad-gauged 
patterns of distribution—of access, opportunity, and so on—affecting society as a whole”). 
 14. Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1908–12 (2011) (describing 
how various provisions of the ACA promote insureds’ financial security). 
 15. John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher 
Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 232 (2016) [hereinafter Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment] (“The 
costs of higher education and the associated student-loan-debt burdens carried by former students 
are large drags on economic growth, social mobility, skills generation, and simply the well-being 
of vast numbers of past, current, and future students.”). 
 16. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 67–95, 115–26.  
 17. See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective 
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1477–84 (2015); Michael Greve & Christopher C. DeMuth, 
Sr., Agency Finance in the Age of Executive Government 30−32 (George Mason U. L. & Econ. 
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settlements,18 and delegations of the power to tax19 has begun to 
explore the issues posed by agency control over inflows of money to 
the government. This vein of scholarship does not address the flip side 
of the coin: agencies’ exercise of control over the power to spend 
government money. Prominent scholars have recognized that agencies 
will sometimes perform “interpretive jujitsu” to reshape prescriptive 
regulatory regimes to new problems such as climate change.20 But the 
parallel fact of latitudinarian readings of transfer regimes—that is, 
schemes that authorize distributing funds21—has largely escaped 
attention. An influential body of political science scholarship models 
agencies as budget maximizers.22 But that work treats all bureaucracies 
alike; it does not attend to the particular budget dynamics of an agency 
focused on the mission of distributing money or goods. An agency 
avidly accruing resources to spend on its own personnel and programs 
for regulation and enforcement is, however, quite different from an 
agency that seeks those resources in order to confer them upon others. 
 
Series, Paper No. 16-25, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2798289 [https://perma.cc/6CAR-X97G]. 
See generally Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: 
The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1822 (2012) (analyzing the effects of budgetary control and self-funding in executive agencies). 
 18. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 853, 854–913 (2014); Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power: Why 
Congress Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 
327–79; Greve & DeMuth, supra note 17, at 17−24. 
 19. See generally Daniel Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633 
(2017) (offering an account for why the executive branch may resist using available statutory and 
regulatory tools to increase revenues). 
 20. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21 
(2014); see also Adam Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, 187–94 (2015) (discussing immigration enforcement during the Obama 
administration). 
 21. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J. 
1067, 1076–77 (2003) (distinguishing statutory distributional schemes that have the purpose of 
“benefit[ing] a politically influential group” from those that have the purpose of “benefit[ing] 
poor people, people who suffer from discrimination, and people who have suffered a 
misfortune”).  
 22. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 9, 37–
38 (1971) (enumerating the utility functions of bureaucrats, including salary, perks, public 
reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of 
managing the bureau). See generally Matthew Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber & Anne 
Joseph Connell eds., 2010) (noting the problems with extreme versions but probable accuracy of 
more modest versions of budget-maximizing assumptions).  
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In the latter situation, the executive branch seeks not to fatten its own 
pocketbook, but to improve the financial straits of the citizenry.23 
This is an area that calls for careful thought. Proponents of 
economic rights had the federal courthouse door slammed in their 
faces; they instead queued up at the doors of agencies. In two major 
recent instances, federal agencies opened their doors to admit such 
claims.24 Future agencies may wish to do the same. President Donald 
Trump campaigned on a platform infused with rhetoric about 
economic rights, including the right to “a great education” and the right 
to “a secure job.”25 Though there may be divergences in how they 
conceive of those rights, Republican Presidents, not just Democratic 
ones, are interested in delivering economic goods, and—if Congress 
stands in their way—they may pull the levers of the federal 
administrative state to accomplish that goal.  
Drawing on two examples from the Obama administration, this 
Article assesses the institutional competence of agencies to secure 
economic rights—here, access to affordable health insurance and 
affordable higher education—by exploiting the leeway afforded by 
ambiguous or unclear statutory text to underwrite these rights.26 A 
 
 23. I do not mean to suggest that the executive branch will necessarily be driven by 
“charitable” motives in some Dickensian sense. Transferring economic resources to the less well-
off may be equally compatible with shoring up a low-wage labor market (think, for example, of 
providing food stamps to Wal-Mart employees), with insulating the wealthy from political 
disruption, or with other counterintuitive patterns of incentives. Thanks to Professor Karen Tani 
for pointing this out. 
 24. It unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to supply a historical 
account of past efforts by executive-branch agencies to secure vertical economic rights. For 
accounts of executive-branch spending, see generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING 
POWER (1975); LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS 
OF CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES (1943). More recently, Professor Zachary Price has 
written a fascinating account of interbranch struggles over appropriations and of modern-day 
implications for separation-of-powers disputes between Congress and the executive. See Zachary 
S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 10–18) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing several examples that 
“illustrate how potent Congress’s control over appropriations may be as a means of controlling 
the executive branch”). 
 25. See Press Release, Trump Outlines New Civil Rights Agenda: A Safe Community, A 
Great Education, and a Secure Job (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/
trump-outlines-new-civil-rights-a-safe-community-a-great-education-and-a-se [https://perma.cc/
ZPM6-KUPX]. 
 26. This Article’s area of inquiry is bounded in three important ways. First, this Article does 
not address agency statutory interpretations that trigger non-governmental spending (for 
example, by imposing costs on firms or individuals), whether that spending operates horizontally 
(by causing transfers from private parties to other private parties) or vertically (for example, by 
causing net transfers from private parties to the federal government); its focus is on vertical, 
SOHONI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2017  1:12 PM 
1684  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1677 
threshold point here deserves emphasis. As they are conventionally 
understood, Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.27 and its progeny do not impose any special rules upon this type of 
agency statutory interpretation. Chevron instructed, and City of 
Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission28 recently affirmed, 
that all delegations deserve equal deference, as long as the delegation 
does not threaten to cross into some constitutional danger zone.29 
Because a delegation to spend money is well clear of any recognized 
danger zone,30 it should in principle be treated just like any other 
delegation. And, indeed, when the Obama administration encountered 
challenges to agency actions that interpreted ambiguous statutory 
language to authorize spending money—billions of federal dollars—on 
securing access to affordable health insurance, it cited Chevron,31 just 
as it would have in a case challenging its authority to promulgate a 
prescriptive regulation.   
 
economic measures that cause net transfers from the government to private individuals or entities. 
Second, this Article does not address administrative decisions that indirectly affect the 
government’s overall financial position (for example, regulatory action that reduces economic 
activity and thereby incidentally reduces tax receipts); again, its focus is on decisions that directly 
transfer funds or subsidies to private recipients. Third, this Article picks out and addresses only 
situations where the executive branch’s spending decisions have pushed at or arguably exceeded 
the bounds of its statutory authority, not situations where the executive branch is implementing 
a clear legislative command to spend; its focus is on the executive branch’s competence to make 
broad-scale spending choices, not on congressional competence to make such choices.  
 27. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 28. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 29. Id. at 1874; see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 601–02, 605 (1992); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–18, 330–35 (2000).  
 30. In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, the Court explained: 
Appropriation and other acts of Congress are replete with instances of general 
appropriations of large amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated 
government agencies. A striking and pertinent example is afforded by the Act of June 
17, 1902, c. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, where all moneys received from the sale and disposal of 
public lands in a large number of states and territories are set aside as a special fund to 
be expended for the reclamation of arid and semi-arid lands within those states and 
territories. The expenditures are to be made under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior upon such projects as he may determine to be practicable and advisable. The 
constitutionality of this delegation of authority has never been seriously questioned. 
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 322 (1937). 
 31. See Brief for the Respondents at 55, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) 
(“[T]he traditional tools of statutory interpretation confirm that Treasury’s reading [of Section 
36B] is at least a reasonable one warranting deference under Chevron.”); Defendants’ 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 25, U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-01967-RMC) (“The 
deference accorded to federal agencies under background principles of administrative law 
provides an additional reason for concluding that funds are available for the advance payments 
of the cost-sharing reimbursements.”). 
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The point is that current administrative law doctrine and practice 
treat these agency efforts as falling within, and as being regulated by, 
the normal rubric of administrative law. That normal rubric treats 
agencies as empowered to act pursuant to ambiguous statutory 
authority; our law assumes that agencies will make policy within their 
zones of expertise and that regulatory policymaking will be subject to 
judicial review and will be overseen and constrained by legislative 
checks, thus rendering it both accountable and legitimate. But, as this 
Article explains, when agencies leverage statutory ambiguity to 
underwrite broad-scale government spending, certain distinctive 
concerns arise that sharply undercut the vitality of each of these 
conventional assumptions.32 
Begin with judicial review. Administrative law generally takes it 
as a given that judicial review will police and deter agencies from acting 
outside the bounds of entrusted domains. But when the executive 
branch is giving money away, the check of judicial review on agency 
action will be much weaker than normal; because of the rules of Article 
III standing, it will frequently be impossible to sue to enjoin agency 
spending.33 This, in turn, will make it correspondingly easier for 
agencies to push at the limits of their statutory authority. Consider next 
the possibility of policy entrenchment. Regulatory measures that 
transfer benefits on a broad-scale basis tend to become politically 
entrenched—at least when their recipients are in the middle and upper 
classes. And while prescriptive regulatory measures cannot become 
legally entrenched against alteration, regulatory transfers of property 
sometimes can.34 Agency policymaking in this area may thus be stickier 
and less subject to legislative checking than is often the case—
particularly in light of the fact that this type of agency policymaking is 
 
 32. In a future piece, I intend to explore how the Court’s rejection of the Chevron framework 
in King v. Burwell might be read as indicating its reluctance to extend the ordinary amount of 
deference to agency interpretations that generate large financial obligations against the federal 
government—or, to put it another way, as creating a clear-statement rule for certain “vertical” 
elephants in mouseholes. Unlike other “major questions” cases, which have involved claims of 
agency authority over regulatory obligations to the government and/or to private parties, King 
posed the question whether an agency could commit the federal government to spend billions of 
dollars on securing the right to affordable health insurance. In my view, the considerations set out 
in Part II of this Article offer a robust post hoc justification for King’s otherwise rather 
inexplicable decision to eschew reliance on Chevron when the Court was anyway persuaded that 
the statute authorized the result the agency preferred. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
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not always transparent.35 Last, if not least, are the reasons to doubt the 
existence of agency expertise and democratic accountability in this 
domain. When the executive branch exploits statutory ambiguity to 
embark on broad-scale spending programs to secure economic rights, 
the executive branch is making society-wide and intertemporal trade-
offs about the expenditure of government funds. These are trade-offs 
that neither individual agencies, nor the executive branch as a whole, 
are properly equipped to make; rather, these are trade-offs that, for 
reasons of both expertise and democratic accountability, should be 
made by Congress.36 
In sum, agency efforts to spend resources on broad-scale economic 
rights can advance important interests—interests that the federal 
courts have shown no inclination to shield and that Congress may not 
be willing to defend either. But such action simultaneously threatens 
to corrode other deeply important values: the need for accountable 
agency action, the avoidance of unilateral policy entrenchment by the 
executive branch, and legislative supremacy in matters of spending.37  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the measures 
taken by the Obama administration to underwrite widespread access 
to affordable health insurance and affordable higher education. Part II 
analyzes the executive branch’s institutional competence in this zone. 
A brief conclusion follows. 
I.  AGENCIES AND SPENDING: TWO CASE STUDIES 
This Part addresses a simple question that has probably already 
started to nag. Given that Congress controls appropriations and agency 
budgets, how can agencies ever act “on their own steam” to spend 
money on shielding vertical economic rights? Even assuming that 
agencies might attempt to exercise a truly executive “power of the 
 
 35. See infra Part II.C. 
 36. See infra Part II.D. 
 37. In future work, I hope to set out and assess potential responses and solutions to these 
problems. Possibilities might include revisions to rules of Article III standing, perhaps in the 
direction of expanded legislative standing; carving out an exception to the rule of Chevron 
deference when an agency decides a “major question” creating broad-scale spending; a limited 
reversal of INS v. Chadha, 426 U.S. 919 (1983), to permit one-house legislative checks on 
executive spending; or institutional reforms that promote congressional oversight of the most 
significant spending choices made by the executive. See FISHER, supra note 24, at 263–64 (“[T]he 
compilation, analysis, and dissemination of budget execution material must be done with a fine 
sense of selectivity. Distinctions need to be made between the routine and the 
significant. . . . Painstaking efforts are needed to select from the thousands of administrative 
actions the relative few that deserve congressional attention.”).  
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purse,” wouldn’t their attempts be pointless unless Congress made 
good on them by appropriating money? Agencies, we assume, act with 
either permission or forgiveness, with either authorization or 
ratification—particularly, one would think, when it comes to spending 
money, an area in which Congress has traditionally been jealous of its 
prerogatives. By delving into two examples from the Obama 
administration, the discussion below illuminates how agencies have 
leveraged the tools of statutory interpretation to underwrite broad-
scale access to economic goods without clear congressional 
authorization.38
A. Affordable Health Insurance 
The chief goal of the ACA was to expand access to health 
insurance. To achieve that end, agencies needed to ensure that 
consumers and insurers received federal subsidies so that insurance 
plans would be affordably priced and consumers would have the funds 
to purchase the plans. The subsidies took various forms and flowed to 
different recipients. For insurers, there were cost-sharing reduction 
payments, risk-adjustment payments, reinsurance payments, and risk-
corridor payments. For individuals, there were premium tax credits. 
The subsidies to insurers enabled insurers to offer plans at affordable 
prices, and the subsidies to consumers enabled consumers to purchase 
those affordably priced plans. These subsidies, along with the mandates 
on some employers to provide health insurance and on individuals to 
obtain health insurance or pay a penalty, were the price tag for the new 
rules imposed by the ACA on insurers—rules for minimum coverage, 
guaranteed issue, and community rating—that collectively extended 
access to affordable health insurance to millions of people. 
To avoid getting lost in the weeds, it might be helpful here to 
imagine the new statutory right to affordable health insurance as a 
living thing or organism. For that organism to be robust and well-
functioning, its “organs”—here, Medicaid, the federal and state 
 
 38. One might draw lines within this category of agency action. For example, one might 
distinguish spending choices that rest on interpretations of ambiguous organic statutes from those 
that rely on interpretations of ambiguous appropriations laws. One might distinguish 
interpretations of the tax code from interpretations of nontax statutes. One might distinguish 
agency interpretive decisions that result in “pure” spending (for example, handing out money 
directly to recipients) from regulatory commands that necessarily trigger increased federal outlays 
(for example, a rule requiring states to expand eligibility for Medicaid). Because the argument 
developed in Part II does not turn on these internal distinctions, this Article refrains from 
taxonomy. 
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exchanges, and the private insurance companies offering plans on the 
exchanges—had to be well-nourished and healthy, too. The array of 
federal subsidies just described—ranging from cost-sharing reduction 
payments to premium tax credits—formed the supply of blood and 
nutrients to these organs. The subsidies created by the ACA were 
interlocking and indirect, but they were collectively designed to 
safeguard a new, government-subsidized, economic right: a right to 
affordable health insurance.  
The difficulty is that agencies have since carried the laboring oar 
in nourishing that right. The Democratic-controlled Congress that 
enacted the ACA did not clearly express some of the key federal 
subsidy provisions that undergirded the act, while the Republican-
controlled Congress which succeeded it was intent on throttling the act, 
not salvaging it. The tax credits at issue in King v. Burwell39 illustrate 
the point. King concerned a provision of the ACA that authorized 
federal tax credits for purchases of health insurance plans on “an 
Exchange established by [a] State.”40 The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) interpreted this ACA provision as authorizing it to provide tax 
credits to consumers purchasing plans on the federal exchange.41 
Without that interpretation, consumers would have not been able to 
purchase plans, and the insurance marketplace in the states served by 
the federal exchange would have collapsed. The IRS’s interpretation 
may have been entirely consistent with enacting Congress’s “legislative 
plan.”42 But it was still a hard fit with the statutory text, which did not 
clearly authorize those credits. Although a five-word fix (“or by the 
federal government”) would have placed the IRS’s payments on a 
secure footing, the Republican-controlled Congress would have rather 
seen the ACA’s reforms collapse than make that fix. 
The provision at issue in King was not, unfortunately, the only 
instance of ambiguity in the ACA. Other aspects of the ACA’s 
implementation have implicated essentially the same fact pattern as 
King: the executive branch authorizing payments to secure the 
affordability of insurance plans and increase access to insurance 
coverage—but without an unambiguous statutory basis for those 
payments.  
 
 39. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 40. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
 41. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2482. 
 42. Id. at 2496 (“A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative 
plan.”). 
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Four examples are worth mentioning.43 The first involves the 
payment of subsidies for cost-sharing reductions to insurers. To 
provide some background, the ACA requires insurers to reduce 
consumers’ cost-sharing obligations for health insurance—the various 
deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments that insurance plans require 
customers to bear. The ACA states that the federal government must 
reimburse insurers for these cost-sharing reductions.44 The agencies 
responsible for these payments, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury,45 
have made billions of dollars of cost-sharing payments under this 
provision. If these payments were not made, many customers would 
have faced higher priced plans46—thus undercutting the right to 
affordable health insurance that the ACA sought to shield.  
The problem is that the ACA does not contain a permanent 
indefinite appropriation of funds from which the agency could make 
those payments. The Obama administration argued that a separate 
permanent appropriation—the one that funds the premium tax credits 
at issue in King—also appropriated money to pay the cost-sharing 
reductions.47 But this argument is at least a stretch, and the conclusion 
that the tax-credit appropriation also supplies funds for cost-sharing 
 
 43. Professor Nicholas Bagley has written extensively and brilliantly about some of these 
topics, and I draw throughout on his various writings. See generally Nicholas Bagley, A Legal 
Setback for the Affordable Care Act, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2307 (2016) (discussing a challenge 
to the ACA provision allowing for reimbursement of low-income citizens); Nicholas Bagley, 
Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2016) 
[Bagley, Legal Limits] (offering an assessment of the Obama administration’s efforts to 
implement the ACA); Nicholas Bagley, The Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA, 370 
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1969 (2014) (discussing the ability of the executive to delay implementing 
the ACA); Mike Adelberg & Nicholas Bagley, Struggling to Stabilize: 3Rs Litigation  
and the Future of the ACA Exchanges, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 1, 2016), http:// 
healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/08/01/struggling-to-stabilize-3rs-litigation-and-the-future-of-the-aca-
exchanges [https://perma.cc/E7YC-T9ZQ] (discussing legal issues facing ACA exchanges). 
 44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1402, 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(3) (“An issuer 
of a qualified health plan making reductions under this subsection shall notify the Secretary of 
such reductions and the Secretary shall make periodic and timely payments to the issuer equal to 
the value of the reductions.”). 
 45. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1412(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 18082(a).  
 46. See Nicholas Bagley, What Happens if the House Wins Its ACA Lawsuit?, YALE J. ON 
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 21, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/what-happens-if-the- 
house-wins-its-aca-lawsuit-by-nicholas-bagley [https://perma.cc/3H5M-C6Z2] (“[Cost-sharing 
reductions] cap the amount of out-of-pocket spending for those who make less than 250% of the 
poverty level. Given that exchange plans tend to have high deductibles and lots of cost-sharing, 
the reductions are a critical part of keeping health care affordable.”). 
 47. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, supra 
note 31, at 25. 
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reduction payments was rejected initially by the IRS48 and eventually 
by a district court judge.49 
The second example—the risk-corridor payments—involves a 
similar fact pattern.50 The goal of the risk-corridor program was to 
support participation by private insurers in the exchanges by limiting 
their risk of losses. Under the program, “[i]nsurers that sustain[ed] 
heavy losses [were] supposed to receive federal support; by the same 
token, highly profitable insurers [were] required to return some of their 
gains to the federal government.”51 Without this risk-limiting 
mechanism, insurers wary of the risk profile of the customers on the 
new exchanges would have been induced to raise premiums—thereby 
undercutting the right to affordable health insurance that the ACA 
seeks to shield.52 
The problem, again, is that Congress did not appropriate funds to 
pay for the expenses of risk-corridor subsidies.53 Instead, and in the 
face of mixed reviews,54 the unit of HHS responsible for issuing these 
 
 48. The IRS initially concluded there was no appropriation for cost-sharing payments, 
explaining in a U.S. Department of Treasury memorandum that “there is currently no 
appropriation to Treasury or to anyone else, for purposes of the cost-sharing payments” and that 
the basis for making those payments “c[ould] be determined only in connection with whatever 
statute ultimately appropriate[d] funds for the cost-sharing program.” Carl Hulse, Report by 
House G.O.P. Returns Focus to Health Care Law’s Spending Authority, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2016, 
at A10. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, and 
Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew took the opposite view. See Carl Hulse, In a Secret Meeting, 
Revelations on the Battle over Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1WVdCLO 
[https://perma.cc/S89G-VWAH] [hereinafter Hulse, Secret Meeting]. 
 49. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168 (D.D.C. 2016).  
 50. See Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk Corridors and Risk Adjustment, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 17,220, 17,220−21 (Mar. 23, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 153 (2016)) (explaining rationale 
for program and how insurer uncertainty connects with higher rates for consumers).  
 51. Adelberg & Bagley, supra note 43 (emphasis omitted).  
 52. For some, but not all, of those purchasers, the higher costs would have been subsidized 
by higher tax credits.  
 53. See Memorandum from Edward C. Liu, Legislative Attorney, to House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, Funding of Risk Corridor Payments Under ACA § 1342, at 1−3 (Jan.  
23, 2014), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/
20140123CRSMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7YE-JAHJ] [hereinafter CRS Memorandum]; see 
also Nicholas Bagley, Does the Risk Corridor Program Have a Fatal Technical Flaw?, 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (May 1, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/does-the-
risk-corridor-program-have-a-fatal-technical-flaw [https://perma.cc/945T-AE4Q] (“The trouble 
is that the risk corridor program lacks any appropriations language.”).  
 54. See Memorandum from the U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office to Jeff Sessions, Ranking 
Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Budget, and Fred Upton, Chairman, House of 
Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Department of Health and Human 
Services—Risk Corridors Program, B-3256302, at 6 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
670/666299.pdf [https://perma.cc/G93A-6Q7X]. The U.S. Government Accountability Office 
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particular payments, the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), has used incoming payments from insurers to make 
outgoing payments to insurers.  
The agency was forced into this position in December 2014, when 
Congress enacted the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act of 2015,55 popularly known as the “Cromnibus.”56 
This act contained a rider that prohibited the CMS from using funds 
“transferred from other accounts funded by this Act to the [CMS 
program management account]” for making risk-corridor payments.57 
The agency apparently did not regard the risk-corridor payments that 
it draws from insurers and credits to the program-management account 
as funds whose use would be prohibited by the appropriations rider.58 
 
(GAO) noted that the program management appropriation was designated “for carrying 
out . . . ‘responsibilities of [CMS],’” and reasoned that one of those “responsibilities” was to make 
risk-corridor payments. Id. at 4 (second alteration in original) (quoting Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. 
H, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 374 (2014))). The GAO also agreed that under the 2014 appropriations act, 
sums collected from insurers could be treated as “authorized user fees” and credited to the 
“Program Management” account. Id. at 3, 4. In contrast to the GAO, the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) had concluded that amounts coming in from insurers could not be used to fund 
amounts that needed to be paid out. That is, CRS rejected the idea that the ACA authorized the 
agency to create a “revolving fund” that would allow the agency to use inflows to the program to 
pay for outflows from it. See CRS Memorandum, supra note 53, at 2, 3.  
 55. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 
§ 227, 128 Stat. 2130, 2491 (2014).  
 56. See Ashley Parker, Fight Brews in Congress Over Spending Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 
2014, 4:11 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2014/11/25/fight-brews-in-congress-
over-spending-bill [https://perma.cc/8VUC-VW3A]. 
 57. The Cromnibus reads:  
None of the funds made available by this Act from the Federal Hospital Insurance 
Trust Fund or the Federal Supplemental Medical Insurance Trust Fund, or transferred 
from other accounts funded by this Act to the ‘‘Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services—Program Management’’ account, may be used for payments under section 
1342(b)(1) of Public Law 111–148 (relating to risk corridors). 
§ 227, 128 Stat. at 2491. 
 58. One might construct a rationale for this determination as follows. The Cromnibus funds 
the program management account with, inter alia, “such sums as may be collected from 
authorized user fees.” Id. at 2477. So, while the program management account is itself funded by 
the Act, the user fees in the program management account are not funds being “transferred from 
other accounts”—and thus blocked from use by the rider. Id. at 2477, 2491. Rather, the user fees 
are “credited” directly to the program management account. Id. at 2477. In the paragraph on 
program management, the Act says: 
  For carrying out . . . other responsibilities of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, not to exceed $3,669,744,000, . . . together with all funds collected in 
accordance with section 353 of the PHS Act and section 1857(e)(2) of the Social 
Security Act, funds retained by the Secretary pursuant to section 302 of the Tax Relief 
and Health Care Act of 2006; and such sums as may be collected from authorized user 
fees and the sale of data, which shall be credited to this account and remain available 
until September 30, 2020 . . . .  
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And so the agency has proceeded to make payments from these 
collected inflows. But because inflows to the risk-corridor program are 
dramatically lower than claims upon it, the agency has been able to pay 
claims against the program only on a prorated basis.59 In the meantime, 
Congress has not acceded to the need to appropriate more money to 
make good on the balance of the promised payments. Instead, 
subsequent appropriations laws have retained the language of the 
Cromnibus rider.60 
The sums involved here are sizable—billions of dollars have 
flowed into and out of the CMS under the auspices of the risk-corridor 
program. The risk-corridor payments to insurers have probably helped 
to increase the affordability of insurance plans on the exchanges. But 
in making these payments, the agency has relied on aggressive readings 
of the ACA and subsequent appropriations laws. 
A third example is the transitional reinsurance program created 
by section 1341 of the ACA.61 The program “is financed by statutorily 
required contributions from participating health insurance issuers and 
 
Id. at 2477 (emphasis added). The reason that this rationale is a “stretch” is that it effectively 
creates a revolving fund—a form of permanent appropriation—and appropriations law requires 
that Congress specifically authorize the creation of revolving funds. See Bagley, Legal Limits, 
supra note 43, at 1733, 1735–38. 
 59. See Bagley, Legal Limits, supra note 43, at 1737 (“It’s looking more and more likely that 
the risk corridor program will run out of money. . . . [F]or 2014, health plans were owed 
substantially more under the risk corridor program than they paid in. Unprofitable plans have 
therefore received just 12.6% of the amount due to them.”) (citing Memorandum from the Ctr. 
for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/RC_Obligation_
Guidance_11-19-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV25-UGF8]. 
 60. Id. at 1738 nn.149–150 (citing appropriations riders for 2015 and 2016). The proposed 
HHS appropriations bill also contains this language. See H.R. 5926, 114th Cong. § 225 (2016), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr5926/BILLS-114hr5926rh.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY4Q-UM
5W]. 
 61. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1341, 42 U.S.C. § 18061 (2012); 
Standards Related to Reinsurance, Risk Corridors and Risk Adjustment, 77 Fed. Reg. 17220, 
17,221 (Mar. 23, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 153 (2016)) (“The [transitional] reinsurance 
program . . . will reduce the uncertainty of insurance risk in the individual market by partially 
offsetting risk for high-cost enrollees. By limiting issuers’ exposure to high-cost enrollees, this 
program will attenuate individual market rate increases that might otherwise occur . . . .”); see 
also Memorandum from Paulette C. Morgan and Edward C. Liu, Congressional Research Serv. 
to House Comm. on Ways and Means, Information on the ACA Transitional Reinsurance 
Program 3−5 (Fed. 23, 2016), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycomm
erce.house.gov/files/documents/114/analysis/20160223CRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MHT-BHSH] 
(describing the Transitional Reinsurance Program).  
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group health plans.”62 The contributed funds are used to make 
payments to issuers “to stabilize health insurance premiums and 
encourage issuer participation in the health insurance markets.”63 The 
ACA requires that some of those incoming contributions—$5 billion 
of them, over a three-year period64—be allocated to the Treasury.65 But 
because its estimates for developing contribution rates were uncertain, 
HHS announced that it would allocate all of the contributions it 
received from insurance companies for payments out to insurers, until 
its payments reached a stated target.66 Basically, HHS decided to 
allocate all incoming reinsurance funds to pay insurers before giving 
the Treasury the portion allocated to the Treasury by the statute. 
Because the $9.7 billion it collected in 2014 fell short of the target 
figure, HHS remitted nothing to the Treasury. Likewise, the amounts 
collected in 2015 were also expected to be short of the target.67  
The agency has taken the position that the ACA is sufficiently 
ambiguous to permit it to prioritize making these payments to insurers 
rather than depositing in the Treasury the sum specified by the ACA.68 
But the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has rejected 
this argument, concluding that when a shortfall materialized, the HHS 
should have proceeded to allocate funds on a pro rata basis between 
the Treasury and insurers, not redirected the Treasury’s pro rata share 
to insurers.69 Again, the agency’s effort to shore up the affordability of 
 
 62. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO B-328016, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES: TRANSITIONAL REINSURANCE PROGRAM 1 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/680115.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP4W-RKUD]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1341(b)(3)–(4), 42 U.S.C. § 18061(b)(3)–
(4).  
 66. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 3 (“It announced that it would 
allocate all collections first for reinsurance payments until collections totaled the target amount 
set forth for reinsurance payments in [ACA section 1341] for each benefit year.”). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 7 (“We do not see any flexibility under section 1341(b)(4) to allow HHS to expend 
the pro rata share of collections attributable to the Treasury under section 1341(b)(3)(B)(iv)—
approximately $3 billion as of July 2016—to make reinsurance payments. Instead, these 
collections must be deposited in the Treasury.”). 
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plans70 certainly strained, and probably exceeded, the bounds of its 
statutory authority.71 
A fourth and final example is the Basic Health Program.72 The 
ACA authorizes states to establish a Basic Health Program for low-
income individuals who are ineligible for Medicaid but have incomes 
close to the Medicaid cut-off line.73 Two states—New York and 
Minnesota—have implemented Basic Health Programs.  
The HHS appears to have supplied funds for these Basic Health 
Programs out of the permanent appropriation for premium tax 
credits.74 Publicly available documents do not reveal why;75 perhaps it 
is because the provision on how to calculate the Basic Health Program 
 
 70. Matthew Loughran, GAO: Government Misuses Obamacare Reinsurance Funds, 
BLOOMBERG BNA: HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT (Sept. 29, 2016) (“In a statement provided 
to Bloomberg BNA, the HHS said its Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ‘has 
implemented the Transitional Reinsurance Program lawfully and in a transparent manner, and 
strongly disagrees with today’s GAO opinion. This critical program, which expires this year, helps 
to reduce premiums for consumers.’”). 
 71. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 11.  
 72. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012) 
(explaining the Basic Health Program option); see also Final Rule, Basic Health Program: State 
Administration of Basic Health Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. 14,112 (Mar. 12, 2014) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 600 (2016); 45 C.F.R. pt. 144 (2016)) (summarizing the Basic Health Program scheme).  
 73.  See STAN DORN & JENNIFER TOLBERT, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ACA’S BASIC 
HEALTH PROGRAM OPTION: FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATE TRADE-OFFS 1–2 (2014), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/the-acas-basic-health-program-option-federal-requirements-and-
state-trade-offs-report [https://perma.cc/QC33-5EM2] (explaining income and other eligibility 
requirements for enrollees in a Basic Health Program). 
 74. See HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE ACCOUNTING STRUCTURE USED FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF PREMIUM TAX CREDITS 19, (Mar. 31, 2015), https://oig.hhs.gov/
oei/reports/oei-06-14-00590.pdf [https://perma.cc/US5T-DTZS] (showing $60 million paid in 
December 2014 for the Basic Health Program outlay); Peter Sullivan, GOP: Administration 
Ignoring ObamaCare Subpoenas, HILL (May 31, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/health
care/281742-gop-administration-ignoring-obamacare-subpoenas [https://perma.cc/2FP6-2HDN] 
(“The administration argue[d] that that it already has a permanent appropriation under the 
[ACA] section covering the law’s tax credits, but Republicans sa[id] that permanent 
appropriation was strictly only for the tax credits, not for the Basic Health Program.”). 
 75. Few relevant documents are currently publicly available. As Lyle Adriano notes:  
The [House Committee] chairmen asked for the spending documents July last year 
after assistant HHS secretary Ellen Murray referenced them during a briefing. In 
November, HHS produced 24 pages of documents, with some parts redacted. In March, 
the department informed the committees that it would not provide any additional 
documents. The committees issued a subpoena later that month, but they only received 
one heavily redacted page since.  
Lyle Adriano, The Obama Administration Is Ignoring ACA Document Subpoenas, GOP Says, 
INS. BUS. MAG. (June 2, 2016), http://www.ibamag.com/us/news/breaking-news/the-obama-
administration-is-ignoring-aca-document-subpoenas-gop-says-32667.aspx [https://perma.cc/BN
2M-ASF5]. 
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payments refers to the amount of tax credits made available by the 
ACA as a benchmark for calculating these payments.76 But the 
permanent appropriation for tax credits has never been used to fund a 
Medicare-like trust fund for states. If there is a colorable statutory 
argument for why the appropriation for tax credits should fund a 
Medicare-like trust fund, it has not yet been publicly made. 
Let us pause to take stock. In all these instances, the executive 
branch has adopted aggressive interpretations of the ACA or of 
relevant appropriations laws in order to disburse money. But the 
outcome obtained by the executive branch was not the aggrandizement 
of the salaries of agency officials or the addition of employees to the 
agency’s payroll. Rather, to help secure the public’s right to affordable 
health insurance, these interpretations sought to pump any subsidies 
that the executive branch could plausibly claim into the intricate 
vascular system of money created by the ACA. 
B. Affordable Higher Education 
The executive branch has also dedicated billions of government 
dollars to underwrite students’ right to an affordable higher education. 
The funding mechanism for securing this right differs from that used in 
the health insurance context. Here, the mechanism utilized is not 
generous outright spending, but rather generous debt forgiveness. 
To enable student borrowers to repay federal student loans, the 
federal government offers several income-driven repayment plans.77 
For decades, Congress has required the U.S. Department of Education 
to offer the Income-Contingent Repayment Plan (ICR), which caps 
borrowers’ payments at a set percentage of their incomes and forgives 
 
 76. The ACA sets forth a formula for calculating how much money HHS should transfer to 
states that create an acceptable Basic Health Program. Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051. The ACA directs HHS to calculate the amount that would have 
been provided, through tax credits and cost-sharing reductions, to individuals enrolled in the 
Basic Health Program if those individuals had instead enrolled in plans offered through 
exchanges. States are to receive 95% of that amount. See Basic Health Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 
14,112, 14,139 (Mar. 12, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600 (2015); 45 C.F.R. pt. 144 (2016)) (“The 
provisions of this rule are designed to transfer funds that would be available to individuals for 
premium and cost-sharing reductions for coverage purchased on an Exchange to states to offer 
coverage through a Basic Health Program.”). 
 77. See FED. STUDENT AID, INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLANS FOR FEDERAL STUDENT 
LOANS 1 (2016), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/income-driven-repayment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BN2H-WDSA]. 
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the debt after a set period of years.78 In 2007, Congress mandated the 
creation of an additional program that similarly capped borrowers’ 
monthly loan payments at a percentage of the borrower’s discretionary 
income and forgave remaining debt after a specified number of years. 
This new program was called the Income-Based Repayment Plan 
(IBR).79 Three years later, when Congress enacted the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 alongside the ACA, it “amended 
IBR to shorten the repayment period to 20 years and reduce the 
repayment obligation to 10% of discretionary income for those who 
borrowed in 2014 or later.”80  
The Department of Education thereafter undertook two 
regulatory actions that significantly expanded the scope and effect of 
these loan forgiveness schemes. In 2012, the Department of Education 
rolled out a new program called the Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan 
(PAYE), which “deployed funds to permit those who had borrowed in 
2007 or later and entered repayment in 2012 or later to enroll in this 
more generous version of IBR.”81 As Professor John Brooks explains, 
the Department of Education accomplished this goal by “using its 
authority under the ICR, not IBR, provisions of the Higher Education 
Act.”82 It did so because the IBR provisions would not be effective until 
2014,83 whereas the ICR provisions already conferred “relatively 
expansive authority” upon the Secretary to specify when loans must be 
repaid.84 By using the extant ICR provisions, the Department of 
 
 78. See Frank Pasquale, Democratizing Higher Education: Defending and Extending 
Income-Based Repayment Programs, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2015).  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 7 (emphasis added); see 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e) (2012) (“Special terms for new 
borrowers on and after July 1, 2014”). 
 81. Pasquale, supra note 78, at 7. 
 82. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 15, at 252 n.131; see also Federal Perkins 
Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct 
Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,086, 42,099 (proposed July 17, 2012) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 
674, 682, 685 (2016)) (describing the “ICR-A Plan”).  
 83. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(E) (2012) (granting the Secretary expansive authority to specify 
when IBR loans must be repaid, but specifying that this authority must be implemented according 
to 20 U.S.C. § 1098e); Id. § 1098e(e) (indicating that the special terms would not be effective for 
“any loan made to a new borrower on or after July 1, 2014”).  
 84. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 15, at 252 n.131 (“This is because the IBR 
provisions of the HCERA had a 2014 effective date, whereas Section 455(d)(1)(D) of the HEA 
was already in effect and gave relatively expansive authority for setting loan repayment terms.”); 
see 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D). This provision states: 
(1) Design and selection. Consistent with criteria established by the Secretary, the 
Secretary shall offer a borrower of a loan made under this part a variety of plans for 
repayment of such loan, including principal and interest on the loan. The borrower shall 
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Education was able to “accelerate[] the implementation of the new 
10% payment program” to those who borrowed as early as 2007.85 
The second action occurred in 2014, when President Obama 
“called on the [Department of Education] to develop a program to 
assist pre-2007 borrowers,” too.86 In 2015, the Department of 
Education responded by issuing a proposal for a new program, called 
the Revised Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan (REPAYE). The 
REPAYE program, which went into effect in 2016, extended PAYE to 
all borrowers regardless of when they borrowed.87 REPAYE was 
promulgated under the ICR provisions, just as PAYE had been.88 
Commentators have noted the sea change wrought by these 
programs. As Brooks explains, the Department of Education’s PAYE 
program made “a huge change in the way we publicly finance higher 
education” by “simply changing the repayment terms for a student loan 
and adding a forgiveness provision.”89 As he argues, “[t]hough 
described as a loan-forgiveness program, . . . income-driven repayment 
operates conceptually more like a progressive tax-and-transfer 
program,” because the program’s effect, “if it were widely adopted, 
would be as if the government paid tuition costs directly and raised the 
 
be entitled to accelerate, without penalty, repayment on the borrower’s loans under 
this part. The borrower may choose— 
. . . 
(D) an income contingent repayment plan, with varying annual repayment 
amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid over an extended period of 
time prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed 25 years, except that the plan 
described in this subparagraph shall not be available to the borrower of a Federal 
Direct PLUS loan made on behalf of a dependent student . . . . 
Id. § 1087e(d)(1). 
 85. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 15, at 252. 
 86. Pasquale, supra note 78, at 7 (emphasis added); see also Memorandum from President 
Obama to the Sec’ys of Treasury and Education, Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan 
Borrowers Manage Their Debt 1−3 (June 9, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-
title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2015-title3-vol1-other-id214.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7BG-AAKA] (ordering 
the Secretary of Education to take additional steps to expand and support the PAYE program).  
 87. Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,608, 39,627 (proposed July 9, 
2015) (codified at 34 C.F.R pts. 668, 682, 685 (2016)). REPAYE “extend[ed] a plan with payments 
based on 10 percent of the borrower’s discretionary income to borrowers with no restriction on 
when they borrowed.” Id. 
 88. See id. at 39,616 (“To carry out the objective of the Presidential Memorandum, the 
Secretary initiated this rulemaking process to propose the creation of the new REPAYE plan as 
a type of Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) plan in the Direct Loan Program under section 
455(d)(1)(D) of the HEA.”); supra note 84. 
 89. John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1071 (2016) [hereinafter 
Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending]. 
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money to do so in a somewhat progressive way and as a percentage of 
income.”90 In other words, these programs effectively replaced many 
student loans with a progressively financed income tax: “[F]or some 
borrowers, the government effectively pays their tuition, and the 
borrowers simply pay 10% of discretionary income—effectively a 10% 
income surtax. This is not so different—again, to a first 
approximation—from a world where tuition is free, financed by higher 
income tax rates.”91 Under the reformed regime, students incur debt 
that must be repaid, but it is debt with a sharply diminished prospect 
of default: “those who earn more pay more, returning the full amount 
of their loan, plus interest, before the 20-year forgiveness threshold is 
met. Those who earn less, for whatever reason, pay less. Nobody will 
ever default simply because they can’t afford to pay.”92  
Where did this sea change come from? Not from a federal court 
suddenly ruling that student loan agreements with the federal 
government were unenforceable because an affordable higher 
education is a constitutional right. Nor did it come from Congress. It is 
true that Congress established an IBR program in 2010, but it did so 
only for those taking out loans after 2014.93 It was executive action that 
“accelerated the implementation” of the scheme94 by adjusting the 
program so it would not just extend prospectively from 2014, but also 
reach back to cover loans taken out as long ago as 2007.95 And it was 
the executive branch that subsequently expanded the payment further 
backward in time, to all borrowers regardless of when they borrowed.96  
The sums that will be forgiven are sizable. The Department of 
Education estimated a net budget impact of $15 billion traceable to 
REPAYE standing alone.97 While there is substantial uncertainty 
 
 90. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 15, at 258.  
 91. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, supra note 89, at 1070. 
 92. Kevin Carey, A Quiet Revolution in Helping Lift the Burden of Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES: 
THE UPSHOT (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/upshot/a-quiet-revolution-in-
helping-lift-the-burden-of-student-debt.html [https://perma.cc/88E6-JBJ3]. But see Jonathan D. 
Glater, Student Debt and the Siren Song of Systemic Risk, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99, 105 n.26 
(2016) (“The benefit of these programs is economically the same as an up-front, ex ante subsidy, 
but they do not eliminate the need to borrow and do not eliminate debt’s potentially discouraging 
and punishing effects.”). 
 93. See supra notes 76−79 and accompanying text. 
 94. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 15, at 252. 
 95. See supra notes 80−82 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 84−86 and accompanying text.  
 97. In 2015, when promulgating the proposed rules for REPAYE, the Department of 
Education estimated that the new program would “have a net budget impact of $15.3 billion, of 
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around these estimates, it is clear that these programs are not going to 
be cheap. 
How could an agency interpret a statute so as to incur expenses 
(or, if you prefer, forgo repayments) on this scale without first 
procuring Congress’s sign-off? The answer has to do with how funds 
for the making and forgiveness of loans are appropriated and 
budgeted. Congress has permanently appropriated funds for extending 
student loans.98 And the cost of forgiving student loans is not something 
that needs to be appropriated. Federal budget rules require that “the 
government record[] only the expected difference between outlays and 
receipts on the loan as a budgetary cost, which is only a small fraction 
 
which $8.3 billion is a modification for existing cohorts from 1994 to 2015 and $7 billion is related 
to future cohorts from 2016 to 2025.” Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family 
Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 
39,608, 39,626 (proposed July 9, 2015); id. at 39,627 (“[T]he Department estimates that for cohorts 
from 1994 to 2025, approximately six million borrowers would be eligible for the REPAYE plan. 
We estimate that approximately 2 million borrowers would choose the REPAYE plan.”). In 2015, 
a Slate journalist reported, “The White House Office of Management and Budget told me that it 
thinks Obama’s executive action expanding eligibility for Pay as You Earn will cost the feds about 
$9 billion, while the administration’s outreach efforts will cost another $15 billion as more people 
opt into the program. The grand total: $24 billion.” Jordan Weissmann, How Obama Sneakily 
Spent $24 Billion Helping Students Pay Back Their Loans, SLATE (Feb. 5, 2015, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/02/05/obama_pay_as_you_earn_how_the_president
_spent_24_billion_helping_borrowers.html [https://perma.cc/H8RM-VHB9]. The GAO recently 
estimated that $108 billion in loans would eventually be forgiven across all income-driven 
repayment plans and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Plan. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-17-22, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS INCOME-
DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLAN BUDGET ESTIMATES 51 & fig. 18 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/681064.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZKE-4GUT]. 
 98. See Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 15, at 252 n.132 (describing loan 
programs as “entitlement” programs because “funds are automatically available each year 
depending on qualifying formulas, as opposed to a discretionary program that requires Congress 
to appropriate funds annually”) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(a) (2012))); id. at 259 n.182 (“The 
individual cash flows to and from the public associated with the loans or guarantees, such as the 
disbursement and repayment of loans, the default payments on loan guarantees, the collection of 
interest and fees, and so forth, are recorded in the credit program’s non-budgetary financing 
account.” (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2015: ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 37 (2014)) (emphasis added)). 
One CRS report states: 
Most mandatory credit programs receive automatic funding for the amount of credit 
needed to meet the estimated demand by beneficiaries, which depends on eligibility 
and benefits rules contained in substantive law. For mandatory credit programs, any 
additional cost from reestimates of subsidies for a credit program is covered by 
permanent indefinite budget authority. 
JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42632, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FEDERAL 
CREDIT (DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES): CONCEPTS, HISTORY, AND ISSUES FOR THE 
112TH CONGRESS 6 (2012).  
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of the nominal amount of money actually loaned to pay tuitions.”99 
When the actual loan is forgiven, the cost does not appear on the 
budget. “[B]ecause of a quirk in the budget process for credit 
programs,” the Department of Education can simply add these loan 
costs to the deficit “automatically, without seeking appropriations or 
even approval from Congress.”100 In other words, debt forgiveness does 
not come out of the Department of Education’s annual budget or out 
of the appropriations process; it is not money that the agency needs to 
obtain from Congress before it acts.101  
It should be obvious that the Department of Education’s actions 
were not required by statute, but instead leveraged statutory ambiguity 
to produce the desired policy outcome. It should be equally obvious 
that these actions will be consequential—both for students and for the 
public fisc. The agency has enabled millions of students to pay for 
higher education, with the price to be subsidized by the federal 
 
 99. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, supra note 89, at 1070 (citing Federal Credit Reform Act 
§ 502(5)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(B) (2012); then citing Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra 
note 15, at 256). One CRS report provides an overview of the student loan programs and how 
they are funded: 
Federal credit consists of federal direct loans and federal loan guarantees. The William 
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program is a direct loan program, and the Federal Family 
Education Loan (FFEL) program is a guaranteed loan program. Loan subsidy costs for 
these programs are funded through mandatory indefinite appropriations. According to 
requirements of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), the budgetary costs 
of direct loans and loan guarantees are measured on the basis of their estimated long-
term costs to the government on a net present value basis, and these costs are 
attributable to the fiscal year during which a direct loan obligation or guaranteed loan 
commitment is made (as opposed to the year during which the cash flows associated 
with these benefits occur). 
ALEXANDRA HEGJI, DAVID P. SMOLE & ELAYNE J. HEISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43571, 
FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS AND LOAN REPAYMENT PROGRAMS 28 (2016).  
 100. Michael Grunwald, The College Loan Bombshell Hidden in the Budget, POLITICO 
MAGAZINE (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/the-college-loan-
bombshell-hidden-in-the-budget-114930 [https://perma.cc/6F68-ZJ9F]. Michael Grunwald 
discusses this “quirk”: 
  Student loan defaults increased somewhat last year, but the department says the 
primary drivers of the unprecedented “re-estimate”—budget-wonk jargon for the 
update of expected loan costs—were Obama’s policy changes, the recent ones as well 
as the upcoming ones. And because of a quirk in the budget process for credit 
programs, the department can add the $21.8 billion to the deficit automatically, without 
seeking appropriations or even approval from Congress. 
Id. 
 101. See Kevin Carey, Flip Side of Reducing Student Debt Is Increasing the Federal Deficit, 
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/upshot/
calculating-the-price-to-taxpayers-of-easing-the-student-debt-burden.html [https://perma.cc/QN
V6-2ND7] (“Unlike conventional student aid programs such as Pell Grants, loan forgiveness 
benefits are a matter of regulatory policy. They don’t have to be fought for and approved every 
year as part of the annual budget process.”).  
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taxpayer, but without going through the ordinary appropriations 
process.102 This is a vertical economic right to affordable higher 
education, and it flows from actions taken by an agency, not by 
Congress.  
II.  INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND VERTICAL 
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
A common thread connects the examples reviewed above: a 
pattern of agencies aggressively pushing the bounds of statutory 
language to underwrite broad-scale government spending to secure 
access to economic goods. While some constitutional law scholars have 
been calling for courts to recognize economic rights in the Constitution, 
some agencies have been quietly acting to ensure widespread access to 
certain economic goods through existing statutory schemes and 
regulatory mechanisms—notwithstanding the absence of express ex 
ante congressional authorization for these efforts.  
This pattern is broadly compatible with larger trends observable 
across the administrative state. Due to gridlock and partisanship, 
Congress is less able to act as an effective lawmaker and hence as an 
institution that actually authorizes and controls agency action.103 With 
respect to some statutes, as Professors David Barron and Todd Rakoff 
have pointed out, Congress has conferred primary custodianship over 
the shape and structure of regulatory schemes on agencies by giving 
agencies the power to waive and alter key statutory requirements.104 In 
other areas, as Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have 
argued in the context of immigration law, the accretion of complex 
statutory schemes and the opacity of legislative intent have together 
produced a system of “de facto delegation” that effectively transfers 
lawmaking power to the executive branch.105  
 
 102. Or, as one journalist rather blithely put it, “[i]f you focus on the deficit and the deficit 
alone, then yeah, [the increased cost] looks kind of bad. But if you focus on the fact that the White 
House found a way to provide billions in student loan relief without asking permission from 
Congress then, well, it’s kind of impressive.” See Weissmann, supra note 97. 
 103. See William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 773, 
776−77 (2014); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 39–48 
(2014).  
 104. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 
279–90 (2013) (discussing statutes related to education, health care, welfare, the budget, national 
security and foreign affairs, and immigration). 
 105. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, passim (2015). 
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In tandem with and in response to congressional stasis, 
administrative lawmaking has also evolved. Consequential 
administrative lawmaking has increasingly occurred through formerly 
unusual or interstitial mechanisms subject to light procedural 
constraints and judicial review—for example, policies of programmatic 
waiver or delay, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs review, 
settlements that approximate regulatory schemes, and informal tools 
of regulation such as “Dear Colleague” letters.106 Even when agencies 
regulate through more quotidian methods, they often need to take 
more interpretive liberties than they formerly did. As Professors Jody 
Freeman and David Spence have noted, because Congress won’t 
update old statutes,107 agencies must engage “in ‘interpretive jujitsu’ to 
adapt the statute to contemporary imperatives.”108 Surveying this 
landscape, Professor Tom Merrill has observed that the emergent 
regime of administrative lawmaking “[c]umulatively . . . present[s] the 
prospect of a revision of the constitutional order in which the President 
exercises autonomous policymaking authority without the need for any 
delegation of power from Congress, at least for the duration of the 
presidential administration.”109  
Most scholars have studied the “prospect” of “autonomous 
policymaking” from the vantage point of prescriptive regulation—that 
is, executive action that sets rules for what private parties must or must 
not do. It should have been entirely predictable,110 though, that the 
exercise of “autonomous policymaking authority” by the executive 
branch would eventually extend beyond the arena of prescriptive 
policymaking and into the arena of transfer policymaking—that is, 
executive action that transfers government resources to private 
 
 106. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to 
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 536 (2009); Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1172−73 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1800–03 tbl.1 (2015); Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in 
Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 946−50 (2016).  
 107. Freeman & Spence, supra note 20, at 21. 
 108. Michael E. Herz, New Wine, Old Bottles, and a Do-Nothing Congress, JOTWELL (Mar. 
11, 2015), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/new-wine-old-bottles-and-a-do-nothing-congress [https://
perma.cc/R597-SDSX] (reviewing Freeman & Spence, supra note 20). 
 109. Thomas Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1977 (2015).  
 110. Cf. id. at 1978–79 (“It is not difficult to imagine that future Presidents will continue to 
exploit the gaps where judicial review is not available and, building on these gaps, will seek to 
expand presidential administration in ways perhaps not presently imaginable.”). 
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parties.111 The examples described above illustrate that this possibility 
has materialized. The executive branch has demonstrated, at least in 
the realms of health insurance and higher education, that it is both 
willing and able to protect broad-scale vertical economic entitlements 
by aggressively construing its statutory authority.112  
The elephant in this room (or mouse-hole) is the power of the 
purse. That power belongs to Congress, not the executive.113 The 
Constitution says that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,”114 and the term 
“Law” in that clause refers to statute, not regulation or guidance 
document. The balance of power between the executive branch and 
Congress depends on Congress having control over the purse115—and 
on the executive branch not having it.116 
Several sources of law shield congressional supremacy on 
questions of spending. The doctrine of sovereign immunity helps to 
protect Congress’s prerogative to decide whether to expose the United 
States to financial liability.117 Any waiver of sovereign immunity must 
 
 111. These categories are not entirely watertight. For example, when agencies impose fines 
and agree to settlements in the course of enforcing prescriptive regulations, and transfer the funds 
they win to private parties as restitution, it becomes hard to discern where prescriptive 
policymaking ends and transfer policymaking begins. That type of agency action, as several 
scholars have recognized, raises interesting issues. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 492–511 
(2012); Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair 
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 359–86 (2015); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the 
SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1110–23 (2008); Adam S. 
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 533–39 (2011).  
 112. See supra Part I.  
 113. For a detailed analysis of the spending power, see Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the 
Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345 (1988) (“Agencies and officials of the federal government may 
not spend monies from any source, private or public, without legislative permission to do 
so. . . . All federal receipts must be ‘deposited’ . . . into the Treasury, and all spending in the name 
of the United States must be pursuant to legislative appropriation.”). 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 115. In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2013); U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor 
Relations Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 
1445–46 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 116. See U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 665 F.3d at 1346–47 (“If not for the Appropriations Clause, ‘the 
executive would possess an unbounded power over the public purse of the nation; and might apply 
all its monied resources at his pleasure.’” (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1342, at 213–14 (1833))). 
 117. See Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009) (arguing that “the constitutional preeminence of legislatures in 
determining governmental appropriations” establishes a basis for the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity). 
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be express; in cases seeking relief out of the federal purse, courts do 
not find implied remedies except in rare cases of constitutional 
violation.118 Congress has waived the United States’ sovereign 
immunity from suit in certain situations—for example, for contractual 
claims, for tort claims, and in scattered other contexts—but recovery in 
such suits is subject to a hard limit: Congress’s power over 
appropriations of funds.119 The Administrative Procedure Act contains 
a waiver of sovereign immunity, but only from suits “seeking relief 
other than money damages.”120 Congress has shielded its power of the 
purse through affirmative statutory prohibitions as well, by enacting 
the Anti-Deficiency Act, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, and other 
provisions.121 These statutes dictate limits on agencies’ discretion to 
 
 118. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action for unlawful searches and seizures committed 
by officers acting under color of federal law but noting that implying a cause of action for damages 
for federal constitutional violations may be inappropriate where questions of “federal fiscal 
policy” are involved), with FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (finding no Bivens remedy 
against a federal agency because, inter alia, “[i]f we were to recognize a direct action for damages 
against federal agencies, we would be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the 
Federal Government”), Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 419–20 (1988) (finding no Bivens 
remedy for a Fifth Amendment due process violation), and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 
(1983) (finding no Bivens remedy for a federal employee’s claiming of a violation of his First 
Amendment rights). 
 119. Professor Vicki Jackson explains that although a court may enter a judgment “satisfiable 
only from public funds,” such a judgment “may prove inefficacious, in light of Congress’ power 
over appropriations of public funds.” Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: 
Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 539 (2003) 
(footnote omitted). 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 121. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2 PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 6-34 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter GAO, PRINCIPLES] (“The 
Antideficiency Act is one of the major laws in the statutory scheme by which Congress exercises 
its constitutional control of the public purse. It has been termed ‘the cornerstone of Congressional 
efforts to bind the Executive branch of government to the limits on expenditure of appropriated 
funds.’” (quoting Maj. Gary L. Hopkins & L. Col. Robert M. Nutt, The Anti-Deficiency Act 
(Revised Statutes 3679): And Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis, 80 MIL. L. REV. 51, 56 
(1978))). In addition, 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) permits appropriated funds to be applied only “to the 
objects for which the appropriations were made.” Also, “[t]he making of an appropriation must 
be expressly stated in law,” 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d), and “[i]t is not enough for a statute to simply 
require an agency to make a payment,” Memorandum from the U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office 
to Jeff Sessions and Jeff Upton, supra note 54, at 3. See also GAO, PRINCIPLES, supra, at 6-37−6-
39 (discussing limits on the ability of executive officers to incur obligations). Another relevant 
statute is the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302, which “requires executive branch 
agencies to deposit any monies collected by the agency in the general Treasury account, which 
prevents the agencies from supplementing their appropriations budget.” See Peterson, supra note 
18, at 327 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3302).  
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spend and attach criminal penalties to agency spending that crosses 
those limits.122 
Viewed against this constitutional and statutory backdrop, the 
illegality of agencies spending money absent express congressional 
authority may seem obvious and irrefutable. To the extent that agency 
officials expend or commit public dollars outside of expressly specified 
statutory limits, they threaten the Constitution’s scheme for separated 
powers—Q.E.D.—and possibly commit felonies punishable by jail 
time. 
But it is not quite as simple as that. All agency activity requires 
spending government resources—formulating and enforcing 
regulations, issuing guidance, investigating and adjudicating regulatory 
violations, and so on. No Congress, no matter how far-seeing, could 
anticipate all of the spending and allocation decisions that agencies 
must make and address them in advance with perfect clarity. It cannot 
be the case that every time an agency performs activities without clear 
statutory authority, the agency has violated the Appropriations Clause 
of the Constitution or torn the Madisonian tapestry. Chevron itself 
seems to preclude such a limitation by treating agencies as authorized 
to act when they act based on reasonable readings of statutory 
authority;123 express authority is not necessary.  
The key question, then, is whether the scenario of agencies 
spending money on securing economic entitlements based on 
ambiguous statutory authority poses any special or distinctive concerns 
that justify departing from administrative law’s ordinary assumption 
that agencies can legitimately act pursuant to ambiguous delegations. 
That assumption of administrative legitimacy in turn rests on several 
predicates: that agencies interpreting ambiguous statutes will be 
policed by courts; that agencies are ultimately accountable to 
congressional overseers who can perceive agency action and can check 
it when it runs afoul of legislative preferences; that agencies will act 
within the domains of their expertise; and that agency action, because 
it is subject to presidential control, will be democratically accountable. 
Each of these predicates, as explained below, is weakened in this zone.  
 
 122. 31 U.S.C. § 1350. The criminal penalties, however, may be a “paper tiger.” See Peterson, 
supra note 18, at 339 (noting that although the Anti-Deficiency Act has carried criminal penalties 
since 1905, there has never been a criminal prosecution brought under the Anti-Deficiency Act). 
 123. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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A. Judicial Review 
The presence or absence of judicial review is an important variable 
when calculating the legitimacy of agency action.124 Judicial review 
prevents agencies from crossing statutory lines and hence shields the 
structural value of legislative supremacy. The prospect of judicial 
review incentivizes agency reason-giving and public deliberation 
because the degree of judicial deference is often tethered to the quality 
of these factors.125 And if an agency’s reasons and rationales were not 
already transparent before a lawsuit, they will surely become so during 
the course of litigation. 
Ordinary conceptions of administrative law assume that the check 
of judicial review will cabin and discipline agency statutory 
interpretation.126 When it comes to the domain of agency spending, 
though, the rules of Article III standing make that possibility remote. 
When the executive branch gives away money in excess of statutory 
authority, what private party suffers a distinctive harm? Certainly, 
“every citizen” has “the right . . . to require that the government be 
administered according to law and that the public moneys be not 
wasted,”127 but it is equally certain that this “general right” does not 
translate into Article III standing.128 Only a highly odd set of 
circumstances arising from the cross-cutting subsidy and mandate 
provisions of the ACA made it possible for private plaintiffs to bring 
the challenge in King.129 (Indeed, substantial doubts persisted, even 
until oral argument, about the Article III standing of those parties—
doubts that the parties and the Court seemed willing to shelve in order 
 
 124. Merrill, supra note 109, at 1957–64 (tracing the melding of positivist and process 
traditions in administrative law and explaining the key role played by judicial review in anchoring 
administrative government’s legitimacy).  
 125. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1793 (2007) (“If an interpretation . . . emanates fully formed, from too many offices, 
with too little explanation, and too much possible variation, it does not receive Chevron 
deference. . . . Judicial review may also produce a longer-term gain to the extent that it 
encourages agencies to use oversight-worthy procedures in the future.”). 
 126. See Sohoni, supra note 106, at 940–42. 
 127. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). 
 128. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984) (“[A]n asserted right to have the 
Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on 
a federal court.”); cf. Merrill, supra note 109, at 1973 (noting that “executive waivers of statutory 
requirements will rarely be subject to judicial review” because “those most directly affected by a 
waiver will be relieved of a statutory burden and cannot claim to be adversely affected or 
aggrieved”). 
 129. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487–88 (2015). 
SOHONI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2017  1:12 PM 
2017] ON DOLLARS AND DEFERENCE 1707 
to reach a resolution of the critical question at issue in the case.130) But 
such odd circumstances will not always exist when an agency pays out 
money in arguable excess of statutory authority. In particular, given 
how these specific programs are set up, it seems probable that no 
private plaintiff would have standing to challenge agency payments of 
subsidies to health insurers, agency transfers of money to the states to 
set up Basic Health Programs, or agency forgiveness of student loans. 
This point should not be overstated. Article III standing 
sometimes materializes in unexpected ways.131 Litigants may be highly 
motivated to challenge agency decisions to spend in ways that are not 
clearly authorized by statute, and—given the structural constitutional 
concerns with leaving agencies unfettered leeway to spend—courts 
may be highly motivated to find ways to let those challenges proceed 
to the merits.132 One cannot rule out the possibility that courts will, in 
fact, be enlisted as checks to such agency schemes. 
But the point remains that this kind of agency action is less likely 
to be judicially checked than prescriptive agency policymaking. The 
attenuation of the judicial check does not logically entail that agencies 
will misinterpret their statutory authority or act ultra vires. Clearly, 
judicial review is neither necessary nor sufficient for agencies to act 
within the bounds of their statutory authority—myriad legitimate 
nonreviewable agency decisions and myriad court decisions reversing 
illegitimate agency action amply prove that point. The point is just that 
the lower likelihood of judicial review in this context opens up space 
for ultra vires agency action in the zone of transfer policymaking—
space that may not be as available elsewhere.
 
 130. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–7, 39–44, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). 
 131. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (considering climate change’s 
potential impact upon Massachusetts in its decision to grant the state “special solicitude” in the 
standing analysis, ultimately allowing Massachusetts to challenge the EPA’s denial of a petition 
for rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources under the Clean Air 
Act). One can imagine a situation in which entities that compete with recipients of government 
funds would have standing to challenge the legality of those disbursements. See La. Energy & 
Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (articulating rules for establishing 
competitor standing). To my knowledge, no such challenges have been brought with respect to 
the particular agency programs discussed in this Article. I am grateful to Professor Scott Dodson 
and Professor Zach Price for helpful comments on this point. 
 132. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76–77 (D.D.C. 
2015) (granting the U.S. House of Representatives standing based on the injury to its institutional 
power under the Appropriations Clause). Thanks to Professor Richard Re for his helpful 
comments on these points. 
SOHONI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2017  1:12 PM 
1708  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1677 
B. Entrenchment 
Where agencies strain at the boundaries of ambiguous statutory 
authority, the downside risk is generally limited by the fact that 
Congress retains ultimate control over agency action. Even when 
courts cannot review agency action, administrative law assumes that 
future lawmakers, at least, can override and discard agency 
policymaking. In this domain, however, this may not be so easy. When 
they engage in broad-scale spending or commitments of financial 
resources, agencies have a greater ability to entrench commitments in 
ways that may hamstring future lawmakers.  
The explanation of how agencies are able to entrench 
commitments flows from the difference between legislative actions and 
certain kinds of executive-branch actions. Statutes that create 
economic entitlements do not become legally entrenched as a formal 
matter. The Supreme Court has held that even “accrued” rights, such 
as Social Security benefits, can be repealed by Congress.133 To hold 
otherwise would permit an earlier Congress to bind a later one. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has frequently rejected claims that 
agencies and agency officials have, by their actions, “estopped” the 
government from denying benefits where granting those benefits 
would be clearly ultra vires.134  
The entrenchment picture becomes more complex, however, 
when executive-branch actors create vested rights by entering into 
contracts. Although the Contracts Clause does not apply to the federal 
government,135 “it is clear that the National Government has some 
capacity to make agreements binding future Congresses by creating 
vested rights.”136 By entering into a contract (for example, a loan 
 
 133. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (“We must conclude that a person covered 
by the Act has not such a right in benefit payments as would make every defeasance of ‘accrued’ 
interests violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 134. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 428 (1990). 
 135. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732, n. 9 (1984). 
 136. United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 876 (1996) (Souter, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added) (citing Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 
U.S. 571 (1934)); see also Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751, 779 
(2003) (rejecting the claim that “the 1994 amendments come under the unmistakability doctrine 
because they saved money that, in turn, could be employed for the general welfare,” because the 
unmistakability doctrine “does not apply where instead Congress uses the funds saved from 
reneging on the government’s contractual obligations for other public purposes.”); Jon D. 
Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 773–74 (2010) (noting that courts 
“tend to resist efforts by successor governments to change or cancel existing government contracts 
that they have inherited”).  
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forgiveness agreement), the executive branch can create such a vested 
right. Moreover, it can shield that vested right against future regulatory 
change by omitting provisions that protect the government against such 
change.137 Legislative or administrative attempts to undo such vested 
rights down the road could subject the government to liability for a 
breach of contract or give rise to a takings claim.138  
Consider, too, the situation faced by the companies that have 
received risk-corridor or risk-adjustment subsidies,139 or the states that 
have received funds to operate Basic Health Programs.140 It is surely 
illegal to fraudulently apply for such monies; but, in this case, whatever 
illegality attends to these payments flows from the executive branch’s 
overgenerous statutory interpretation, not from the actions of the 
recipients.141 If the current presidential administration or Congress 
 
 137. Winstar, 518 U.S. 878–79 n.22 (noting that “sovereign power” does not include 
governmental actions that would “abrogate one of [the government’s] contracts by a statute 
abrogating the legal enforceability of that contract, [g]overnment contracts of a class including 
that one, or simply all [g]overnment contracts”); id. at 880 (“So long as such a contract is 
reasonably construed to include a risk-shifting component that may be enforced without 
effectively barring the exercise of [sovereign] power, the enforcement of the risk allocation raises 
nothing for the unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and there is no reason to apply it.”); 
GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 329–30 (2000). As Michael 
Graf has argued:  
  The elimination [by Winstar] of the unmistakability doctrine from interpretation of 
rights under quasi-regulatory agreements amounts to a significant power shift away 
from the government’s sovereign authority and towards the property rights of private 
contractors. . . . 
  . . . [I]n many cases, quasi-regulatory contractual rights will no longer be ‘subject to’ 
the exercise of the government’s sovereign powers. Under Winstar, these contractual 
rights will thus rise to a level approaching that of the fee simple estate in [Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)], ultimately superior in constitutional status to 
the government’s police power. 
Michael W. Graf, The Determination of Property Rights in Public Contracts After Winstar v. 
United States: Where Has the Supreme Court Left Us?, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 197, 247–48 (1998). 
 138. See Cuyahoga Met. Housing Auth., 57 Fed. Cl. at 780; Centex Corp. v. United States, 49 
Fed. Cl. 691, 712 (2001); Eric Posner, Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts 28 (U. 
Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 132, 2001), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/54Q6-KRDZ] 
(“If Congress refused to appropriate funds to pay damages [for a breach of a contract with the 
government], or took the more radical step of repealing the Tucker Act with respect to the law in 
question, the Court might hold that Congress has expropriated a vested contract right in violation 
of the takings clause, or legislated retroactively in violation of the due process clause.”). 
 139. See supra notes 43–71 and accompanying text.  
 140. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 141. Cf. Survivor Benefit Plan—Waiver of Erroneous Annuity Payments, B-133142, B-
178696, 1978 WL 11284, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 6, 1978) (waiving annuity overpayments in 
excess of statutory authority where “the error was administrative and that there is no evidence of 
fraud, misrepresentation, fault or lack of good faith on the part of the annuitants” and “recovery 
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tried to claw back payments made by a past administration, the 
recipients could plausibly raise a variety of equitable defenses and 
arguments.142 Moreover, a past administration that wanted to shield its 
spending choices from being unwound down the road might be able to 
enhance the plausibility of such arguments and defenses simply by 
continuing to pronounce publicly that, and distribute money as if, there 
was no legal dubiety in the recipients’ right to receive payment. When 
CMS, for example, issues regulatory guidance stating to insurers that it 
is “recording” its unpaid risk-corridor payments as “binding 
obligations of the federal government,”143 such guidance may actually 
make it harder for a future Congress to legislate those unpaid payments 
away.  
Potentially more important than legal entrenchment is the more 
pragmatic obstacle of political entrenchment. Agencies can entrench 
rules as a practical matter, if not formally. This can happen even with 
prescriptive regulatory measures that only impose unpleasant new 
rules.144 But it will happen much more readily with transfer measures, 
particularly those that create “universal” entitlements that benefit the 
politically powerful middle and upper classes.145 Regardless of their 
 
would be contrary to the purpose of the [Survivor Benefit Plans], and it would be against equity 
and good conscience to require recovery from the affected annuitants”).  
 142. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12 (1984) (refusing to disallow all 
claims of estoppel against the government and recognizing at least two cases that “rest on the 
premise that when the Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so 
would harm a private party as a result of governmental deception”); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. 
v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421 (1990) (noting that despite its unbroken record of rejecting 
estoppel arguments, the Court has preserved the possibility that “some type of ‘affirmative 
misconduct’ might give rise to estoppel against the Government”); SISK, supra note 137, at 957–
59 (describing the availability of claims for set-off against the United States). 
 143.  CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., RISK CORRIDORS PAYMENTS FOR THE 2014 BENEFIT YEAR (2015), https://www.cms.
gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/RC_Obligation_Guidance_11-19-
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH7K-XM8X]. 
 144. See Freeman & Spence, supra note 20, at 7 (“Once an agency charts a new policy course, 
and the regulated community begins to respond, it may be difficult to reverse the consequences. 
In this way, an agency’s adaptive strategy is not merely a stopgap—it meaningfully changes the 
policy status quo, reconfiguring the options for Congress should it ultimately choose to act.”); see 
also Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1220 (2013) (describing recent 
Supreme Court cases that have reflected aversion to abrupt regulatory change); Zachary S. Price, 
Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 987 (2017) (explaining that “due 
process principles” may, to a limited extent, “prevent enforcement following assurances that 
planned conduct will not incur sanctions”). 
 145. Compare the political economy of welfare reform or food-stamps reform with the 
political economy of reforming Social Security: 
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formal status, benefits, once conferred, are often sticky things; witness 
Social Security’s “third rail” status.146  
In the coming months and years, it will become clear whether the 
executive-branch measures examined here have succeeded at 
entrenching the rights they were intended to secure. The ACA’s fate 
remains uncertain.147 To the extent its reforms survive, however, one 
signal fact deserves emphasis: the statute would owe that afterlife not 
to Congress, but instead to the executive-branch actions discussed 
above. Those actions kept federal dollars flowing and insurance plans 
being sold for three long and critical years, thereby creating political 
“facts on the ground” that the new Congress and the new President 
have had to negotiate around, rather than override. As for the student 
loan repayment plans, they seem to be on relatively safe terrain at this 
moment.148 In this case, the Obama administration’s loan repayment 
 
[S]ocial policies do differ markedly in the extent to which they give rise to politically 
efficacious support coalitions. Social Security, for example, promotes widespread 
mobilization among the aged, who are well poised to fight cuts. Cash assistance for the 
poor, by contrast, gives rise to an extremely weak, fragmented, and politically 
demobilized constituency, which was unable to present an effective and united front 
against the 1996 welfare reform law. In general, policies are more durable if they create 
or encourage the creation of large-scale organizations with substantial setup costs, 
directly or indirectly benefit sizable organized groups or constituencies, and embody 
long-lived commitments upon which beneficiaries and those around them premise 
crucial life and organizational decisions. 
Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of 
Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 247 (2004) (citations 
omitted). 
 146. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 
YALE L.J. 400, 451, 431 (2015); Frans Penning & Paul Secunda, Towards the Development of 
Governance Principles for the Administration of Social Protection Benefits: Comparative Lessons 
from Dutch and American Experience, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 313, 324–
35 n.39 (2015) (“Because of its hallowed status after almost eighty years in existence, it is 
considered to be politically untouchable and the ‘third rail’ of politics in the United States.”); 
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 426−27 (2007). 
 147. See Noam H. Levey, Trump and the GOP Are Charging Forward with Obamacare 
Repeal, but Few Are Eager To Follow, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.
com/nation/la-na-trump-obamacare-repeal-20161212-story.html [https://perma.cc/6Q4Z-FBGD]; 
Robert Pear, Thomas Kaplan & Maggie Haberman, In Major Defeat for Trump, Push to Repeal 
Health Law Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/us/politics/
health-care-affordable-care-act.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/YHT4-4FLP]. 
 148. In contrast to President Trump’s stance concerning health care, his stance concerning 
student-loan programs has been, at times anyway, far closer to the current status quo. See Josh 
Mitchell, U.S. to Forgive at Least $108 Billion in Student Debt in Coming Years, WALL STREET J. 
(Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-forgive-at-least-108-billion-in-student-debt-
in-coming-years-1480501802 [https://perma.cc/WA9B-FXWP] (“President-elect Donald Trump 
said during his campaign he supported the idea of helping student-loan borrowers. He has 
proposed setting payments at 12.5% of income and forgiving balances after 15 years.”). On the 
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programs may have transformed the landscape of public expectations 
to such an extent that—even given the thunderous effects of the 2016 
election—the legislative elimination of these programs is no longer 
worth the political capital.  
There is no point in making predictions about what Washington 
will do in the years to come. What can be said, though, is that if the 
federal government continues to sustain broad-scale access to 
affordable health insurance and to subsidized higher education loans, 
it will prove that the executive branch, and not just Congress, can 
manufacture “third rails”149 with the tools available to it. 
This point gives a different overtone to this whole debate, and, in 
an important way, splits off into a special category agency efforts to 
expend resources on economic entitlements through aggressive 
statutory interpretation from other sorts of ambitious or 
“latitudinarian” agency actions. It means that certain types of spending 
decisions cannot be checked at leisure, in the long term, when and if 
Congress gets around to rolling back the agency’s program or the 
courts get around to resolving attacks upon it. Rather, the other 
branches’ powers to control agency action must be exerted 
expeditiously, before the right starts to vest or the money gets handed 
over. And the capacity of the other branches to exercise their power 
expeditiously will, in turn, depend on the degree to which agency action 
in this domain is transparent.  
C. Transparency  
At first blush, it might seem that agency action enabling and 
shielding broad-scale economic entitlements must surely be among the 
more transparent things an agency does. Indeed, one might think that 
agency decisions that involve lots of spending would be much easier to 
understand and to check—for both congressional overseers and for the 
public—than decisions involving esoteric matters of securities laws or 
environmental regulation. There is certainly no immediately apparent 
reason to expect that there would be less transparency on questions 
concerning large amounts of spending than on other regulatory 
matters. 
Whatever one may think in theory, the case studies reviewed in 
this Article demonstrate that one cannot safely assume that agency 
 
other hand, Trump “has also suggested winding down the federal student loan program and 
shifting lending to the private sector.” Id. 
 149. See supra note 146. 
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spending choices of this ilk will occur in a completely transparent way. 
Consider the student loan forgiveness programs. The Department of 
Education has been able to effectively create billions in higher-
education subsidies by extending loans and by expanding the 
conditions on which it will forgive past loans.150 This spending on loan 
forgiveness has been “disguised,” as Professor John Brooks notes, 
“because of how budget rules treat federal loans.”151 Matters have not 
been helped by the Department of Education’s failure to supply 
separate cost estimates or estimated forgiveness amounts for PAYE 
and REPAYE.152 
For a different reason, the sources of spending on risk corridors 
and on risk-adjustment subsidies have been obscured, too: the agency 
has used incoming funds to make payments to insurers by creating 
revolving funds, a solution that at least deferred—and, in the case of 
risk-corridor payments, it was hoped might obviate—the need to get 
money appropriated by Congress to make those payments.153 The cost-
sharing reduction payments, drawn from a permanent appropriation 
for tax credits, are perhaps the most transparent of the spending 
choices made in the health-insurance context. But even that spending 
choice was not particularly well publicized, given that “[t]he first hint 
of the administration’s change of heart came when it quietly withdrew 
the cost-sharing payments from the list of funds subject to the budget 
sequester, which applies only to discretionary—not permanent—
appropriations.”154 An unprecedented lawsuit between the U.S. House 
of Representatives and the executive branch has subsequently thrust 
this spending decision and its asserted legal rationale into the 
limelight.155 But that kind of interbranch standoff will occur rarely 
 
 150. See supra notes 86−92 and accompanying text. 
 151. Brooks, supra note 89, at 1064.  
 152. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 97, at 38 (“Education does not produce 
separate cost estimates for each of the five IDR plans [including PAYE and REPAYE] currently 
available, even though these plans provide different benefits to borrowers and will likely have 
different costs to the government.”); id. at 50 (“[S]haring the amount of principal Education 
expects to forgive on loans in IDR plans could help policymakers better understand a key plan 
feature that contributes to their expected costs.”). 
 153. See supra notes 50−60 and accompanying text. 
 154. Bagley, Legal Limits, supra note 43, at 1730 n.102.  
 155. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016). Oversight 
by the (Republican-controlled) U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means also played an 
important role. The committee investigation revealed that when some IRS officials raised 
objections to the Treasury’s determination that cost-sharing payments could come out of the 
permanent appropriation, the officials were briefly shown an OMB memorandum “laying out the 
administration’s justification” and told that they “could not take notes or make copies.” Hulse, 
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(especially when the same party controls both chambers of Congress 
and the presidency), meaning that spending choices of this nature could 
mostly remain in the shadows. The Basic Health Program illustrates 
this point. While the use of the tax-credit appropriation to fund cost-
sharing reduction payments was the subject of litigation in United 
States House of Representatives v. Burwell,156 the executive branch’s 
rationale for using the same appropriation to fund payments for the 
Basic Health Program is still not publicly disclosed or defended, 
notwithstanding efforts to get at that information via congressional 
hearings and subpoenas.157 
The point is that ordinary assumptions concerning agency 
transparency do not seem to translate intact into this context. At least 
a part of this faltering of transparency was surely an artifact of the deep 
political divide between the Obama administration and the 
Republican-controlled Congress. When faced with a hostile Congress, 
an executive branch seeking to deploy funds through aggressive 
statutory interpretation is not going to shout it from the rooftops.158 In 
such a case, transparency might have the unwanted side effect of 
setting off the “fire alarm” oversight that the executive branch may 
prefer to avoid.159 Even when the branches are politically united, 
however, the sparseness of judicial review will likely also contribute to 
a lack of transparency around these spending choices.160 In the absence 
of litigation over nearly any of these agency statutory interpretations,161 
the executive branch has not been forced to defend its legal conclusions 
 
Secret Meeting, supra note 48. After “[t]he O.M.B. officials left the room to allow their [IRS] 
visitors a moment to absorb the document,” the OMB officials “then returned to answer a few 
questions and note that Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. had been briefed and signed off on 
the legal rationale.” Id. In addition, the IRS officials were informed that “Treasury Secretary 
Jacob J. Lew signed off on a separate memorandum approving the spending.” Id. 
 156. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 157. Virgil Dickson, House Republicans Subpoena HHS over Allegedly Illegal Insurance 
Payments, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20160329/NEWS/160329862 [https://perma.cc/LVE9-626H]; Peter Sullivan, Showdown Over 
Obamacare Subpoenas Quickly Escalating, HILL (June 2, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill. 
com/policy/healthcare/281931-showdown-over-obamacare-subpoenas-quickly-escalating [https://
perma.cc/7ZPS-4LDT].  
 158. See, e.g., Hulse, Secret Meeting, supra note 48. 
 159. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 259–60 (1987) 
(discussing how public disclosure requirements decrease incentives for bureaucrats to deviate 
from policy).  
 160. See supra Part I.A. 
 161. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) and United States House of Representatives v. 
Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2016) are, so far, the exceptions. 
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in depth and in a manner subject to adversarial testing. Nor have 
federal judges issued opinions or orders evaluating whether the 
executive branch’s legal conclusions are correct—thus depriving 
Congress and the public of an expert and a (relatively) non-partisan 
source of opinion on the legal rationale and validity of these spending 
choices.162 
The ACA, PAYE, and REPAYE have, of course, been highly 
visible programs, even though the precise details of their financial 
plumbing have remained relatively obscure. Healthcare reform and 
remedying the problem of rising college debt both formed important 
planks of President Obama’s domestic policy agenda, and these 
programs were ineluctably associated with his political promises.163 If 
viewed as examples of the model of “Presidential administration” in 
action,164 these agency efforts to enable and shield access to affordable 
health insurance and affordable higher education likely satisfy some 
conceptions of transparency and of democratic accountability. But, as 
explained in the next section, they fall short when measured against a 
more robust vision of transparency and accountability that would 
tether those concepts to active congressional involvement in, and 
control over, large-scale spending choices. 
D. Expertise and Accountability 
The notion of agency expertise, a chief component of the standard 
case in favor of delegation, is the idea that agencies have access to 
specialized information about their allotted domains and that they are 
equipped with resources that enable them to legislate more 
 
 162. My thanks to Professor Zach Price for emphasizing these points. 
 163. See, e.g., Memorandum from Obama, supra note 86; Barack Obama, President, Remarks 
by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 
[https://perma.cc/KUB3-EKHQ] (requesting that Congress act to make health care and college 
more affordable); id. (“And let’s tell another one million students that when they graduate, they 
will be required to pay only 10 percent of their income on student loans, and all of their debt will 
be forgiven after 20 years—and forgiven after 10 years if they choose a career in public service, 
because in the United States of America, no one should go broke because they chose to go to 
college.”).  
 164. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–46 (2001) 
(presenting a defense of presidential administration on the grounds that it is both effective and 
accountable); see also Merrill, supra note 109, passim (describing the evolution of administrative 
lawmaking from a long-standing “positivist” model of administrative legality—one derived the 
administrative state’s claims to legality from notions of congressional authorization and control—
toward a “proceduralist” model, under which claims of administrative legality derive not from 
delegation but from public input, transparency, and accountability through the President).  
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competently in those domains than Congress would if Congress 
retained power for itself.  
Agency expertise is usually invoked to explain why we rely on 
agencies to perform prescriptive policymaking.165 From the point of 
view of expertise, however, regulatory prescriptions and regulatory 
transfers may not in principle appear very different. If an agency has 
the requisite expertise to determine that a regulation mandating car 
seats for children will promote public safety, then (in principle) an 
agency ought to also have the expertise necessary to determine that 
funding the purchase and proper installation of car seats will promote 
public safety. If an agency has the requisite expertise to determine that 
a state’s educational system fails to provide an adequate education to 
its students, then (in principle) it ought to also have the expertise 
necessary to determine the types and amounts of resources that are 
necessary to supply an adequate education to students in that state. 
These examples can be multiplied ad infinitum, but the gist should be 
clear. If an institution has expertise in a given arena, it will not extend 
solely to awareness of what new prescriptive rules are necessary to 
solve problems; that expertise will also extend to knowledge of how 
and where resources can be deployed to solve those problems.  
Congress itself has long demonstrated confidence in agency 
expertise in the spending and allocation of resources. Congress has 
relied extensively on agencies to set up and run spending programs, 
and it often provides only the broadest and most generous of 
parameters to guide agency spending.166 If we are confident that 
agencies will properly exercise delegated authority to spend when 
Congress imposes essentially no legislative checks on that spending, 
then we are confident that agencies have the capacity to sensibly 
steward vast sums of public money. If the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) has the ability to pick and choose between funding research 
proposals concerning tetanus or diabetes, then one can presume it also 
 
 165. See, e.g., JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & 
REGULATION 351–52 (2d ed. 2013) (“One obvious argument in favor of delegation is that 
administrative agencies may have specialized expertise that makes them more effective 
policymakers, especially in complex technical fields like environmental protection and securities 
regulation.”); Posner, supra note 21, at 1070 (“Agencies have many advantages over their nominal 
overseers such as executive branch officials, members of Congress, and judges: agencies set the 
regulatory agenda within their domain and also have more information about the effects of 
different kinds of regulation.”).  
 166. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 322 (1937) (“Appropriation and other 
acts of Congress are replete with instances of general appropriations of large amounts, to be 
allotted and expended as directed by designated government agencies.”). 
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has the expertise to determine that funding research on the Zika virus 
is a necessary and pressing public health imperative. Congress may not 
have appropriated funding for Zika research, but that is neither here 
nor there for the expertise question. The fact that Congress has not 
appropriated money to cure Zika does not somehow denude the NIH 
of the expertise to determine that a public health catastrophe will occur 
if Zika becomes epidemic.  
The difficulty, though, is that while the NIH has expertise 
concerning Zika, it lacks expertise concerning appropriations. We must 
distinguish here between two different kinds of tasks: deploying 
resources that the legislature has allocated within a given regulatory 
domain, on the one hand, and deploying government resources that the 
legislature has not allocated, on the other. The expertise of agencies is 
the former kind of expertise. The latter kind involves far more difficult 
trade-offs—of priority-setting across the full plane of government 
action,167 and indeed across successive planes of government action 
over time. CMS may know very well that committing billions to risk-
adjustment payments rather than depositing that sum with the 
Treasury will help to lower the cost of health insurance premiums in 
the immediate term. But how can it judge whether those lowered 
premiums are worth more or less than spending those same billions on 
research into Zika, or on global warming research, or on the provision 
of housing vouchers? The Department of Education may know very 
well that expanding loan forgiveness will help many more students 
obtain college degrees. But how can it assess whether this benefit is 
worth the corresponding increase in the federal deficit—an increase 
that might require future cuts to Social Security, Medicare, or defense 
spending? No single agency has the expertise to determine how these 
kinds of allocation decisions should be made at a society-wide level.168  
This lacuna of expertise extends even to the extraordinary and 
difficult case when Congress has previously made a firm promise to 
pay, but then—for whatever reason—subsequently refuses to fund that 
promise with an appropriation. Let us pause to consider this truly awful 
quandary, which agencies have encountered in their efforts to shield 
the right to affordable health insurance.  
 
 167. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
452, 473–74 (2010) (noting that Congress, and not the President, has the power to “make law, 
create institutions, set appropriation levels, [and] allocate enforcement authority among rival 
institutions”). 
 168. See infra notes 175–88 for a discussion of the implications of presidential coordination of 
agency decisions to spend. 
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As described in Part I.A, the ACA promised various subsidies to 
insurers, including cost-sharing reduction payments and risk-corridor 
payments,169 that Congress subsequently refused to fund fully. In 
response, the agency aggressively interpreted its statutory authority to 
pay out on those obligations, either in full or in part. If the agency had 
not made those payments, insurers would have likely been able to file 
suit under the Tucker Act in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to 
recover money out of the Judgment Fund, a pot of money currently 
supported by a permanent indefinite appropriation.170 With respect to 
the risk-corridor payments, exactly such litigation has materialized.171  
On one level, the agency’s action makes good sense: by making 
the payments, the agency fulfilled a clear statutory promise and 
furthered the goals of the ACA by keeping insurance plans more 
affordable, while at the same time avoiding costly and protracted 
litigation down the road. From the point of view of economic 
substance—from the perspective of the insurance companies’ balance 
sheets—this argument has an undeniable logic. Even conceding the 
absence of an appropriation, all the agency has done is deliver to 
insurance companies the money (or a prorated share of the money) 
that insurers could likely have otherwise recovered out of the 
Judgment Fund.172  
But is this the kind of call that a single agency—any agency—has 
the expertise to make? Say, for example, that the Consumer Finance 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) started making payments to veterans that 
the veterans were entitled to receive by statute, but which the CFPB 
lacked the formal statutory authority to make. It would be no 
 
 169. See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text.  
 170. Bagley, Legal Limits, supra note 43, at 1731–32 & n.117, 1738 & n.152 (explaining why 
insurers could sue under the Tucker Act for money recoverable out of the Judgment Fund). The 
district court in United States House of Representatives v. Burwell noted this possibility but 
declined to rule on the viability of a Tucker Act suit. See U.S. House of Representatives v. 
Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 183 & n.20 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Unreimbursed insurers might sue the 
government under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), to receive the money owed them under 
ACA Section 1402(c)(3)(A) . . . . The House disputes whether this language confers an actionable 
right upon the insurers. . . . Because the Tucker Act argument is not ultimately dispositive, the 
Court does not decide whether insurers could sue under the Tucker Act.”).  
 171. See Adelberg & Bagley, supra note 43 (“Insurers have so far filed at least six lawsuits in 
the Court of Federal Claims to recover money due under the risk corridor program. Although 
Congress has not fully funded the program, the insurers argue that the federal government has 
promised to make those payments.”). 
 172. But see Land of Lincoln Mut. Health Ins. Co. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 81, 114 (2016) 
(dismissing as unripe an insurer’s claim that it was entitled to risk-corridor payments before the 
end of the program). 
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justification for the CFPB’s officials to say that Congress had promised 
those benefits to veterans in sufficiently clear terms and that the 
CFPB’s officials had simply accomplished the right economic result. 
It is no different when the reason that the CFPB lacks the formal 
statutory authority to make the payment is a subsequently enacted 
appropriations statute that undoes an earlier payment commitment. In 
guidance, the CMS has declared that “HHS recognizes that the 
Affordable Care Act requires the Secretary to make full payments to 
issuers, and HHS is recording those amounts that remain 
unpaid . . . as . . . obligation[s] of the United States Government for 
which full payment is required.”173 But HHS does not have the 
expertise to determine unilaterally what should or should not count as 
binding “obligation[s] of the United States Government,” upon which 
“full payment” must be made. To put it another way, Congress may 
have indeed written a check, but if Congress then refuses to supply 
funds to an agency to cash that check, an agency cannot then simply 
draw funds from wherever it can in order to ensure that the check does 
not bounce, just because disbursing those funds would save the expense 
and inconvenience of future litigation in the Court of Federal Claims.174 
No single agency possesses the expertise to determine unilaterally 
which obligations a later Congress should continue to honor. To 
conclude otherwise would be to (incorrectly) credit the agency with the 
capacity to anticipate and assess the universe of trade-offs that the later 
Congress must make. 
It is important to note that the equities decisively favor payment. 
Considerations of notice and fairness cut sharply in favor of people or 
companies receiving money that an earlier Congress has firmly 
promised to pay in a statute. That said, the situation boils down to this: 
the agency has been hell-bent on fulfilling earlier statutory promises to 
pay on which a later Congress has been equally hell-bent on reneging. 
But whether Congress is reneging on a past promise or is simply 
declining to appropriate funds for future executive-branch projects, the 
core point remains the same. When an agency expends large sums of 
federal money that are not clearly allocated to it by Congress, it is 
 
 173. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFORMATION & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 143.  
 174. At the very least, litigation through the Court of Federal Claims will have the beneficial 
effect of producing some independent review of, and confirmation that, the statute in fact 
mandates the payment of funds. For a description of the role of judicial review in checking agency 
action, see supra Part II.B. 
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effectively making trade-offs about other regulatory domains—trade-
offs that no single agency is properly equipped to make.  
The next question then naturally occurs: what about the executive 
branch as a whole? Thus far, the discussion of expertise has treated the 
executive branch in a disaggregated fashion, by assessing the expertise 
of individual agencies to make broad-scale spending choices based on 
ambiguous statutory authority. This treatment has bracketed an 
important reality of modern administrative government: that agencies 
do not make decisions autonomously, but instead operate in a 
coordinated fashion at the behest of a centralized and presidentially 
controlled executive branch. At least one of the agency spending 
choices discussed here was made in response to a presidential directive; 
another had its legal rationale signed off on by Cabinet-level officials. 
Perhaps institutional competence should be evaluated not at the level 
of individual agencies, but instead at the level of the executive branch 
as a whole. Even if no single agency is able to make the necessary 
society-wide trade-offs, maybe the executive branch, considered 
collectively, can do so. Perhaps the executive branch as a whole 
possesses an expertise on governmental spending that is greater than 
the sum of its parts. 
At first blush, the idea seems a compelling one. The President, like 
Congress, has a comprehensive governance portfolio, with authority 
over “the full range of regulatory targets and tools.”175 Because the 
President is a single actor who is held democratically accountable to a 
national constituency every four years, the President, too, is apt to pay 
close heed to “the voice of the people.”176 Even more to the point, the 
President actually produces a national budget annually,177 at 
Congress’s command,178 while the congressional budget process has for 
 
 175. Cf. Merrill, supra note 109, at 471 (“Only the legislature has the capacity to select among 
the full range of regulatory targets and tools. Likewise, only the legislature has the ability to 
implement the choices made in ways that are comprehensive and fair.”). 
 176. Cf. id. at 470 (“The legislature is also the branch of government most closely associated 
with the voice of the people, and in a democracy it is fitting that basic questions about the 
allocation and enforcement of power should be determined by the most democratic body.”). 
 177. Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE 
L.J. 2182, 2209 (2016) (noting that the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the President 
to submit a budget proposal to Congress each year).  
 178. 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2012) (requiring the President to produce an annual budget for the 
next fiscal year “[o]n or after the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in 
February”); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 454–
56 (1987) (describing the creation of a coordinated budget process within the executive branch). 
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years been “busted, beleaguered, and broken.”179 The President (or at 
least the Office of Management and Budget180) exercises significant 
control over the process of crafting that budget and then overseeing its 
deployment by myriad federal agencies.181 If competence to spend 
consists in having a panoptic perspective on the federal government’s 
spending, and if the executive branch, taken as a whole, possesses that 
trait, then it would seem to follow that the executive branch is the 
proper institution to determine how federal dollars should be spent. 
The difficulty with this syllogism, however, is that it glosses over a 
critical fact: when the executive branch spends, the money must come 
from somewhere, and the institution responsible for generating that 
money will be Congress, not the President.182 It is no coincidence that 
the Constitution allocates to a single branch not only the powers to 
appropriate183 and to spend for the general welfare,184 but also the 
powers to tax and to borrow against the credit of the United States.185 
The two sets of powers go—and must go—hand in hand,186 because 
engaging in government spending necessarily entails making decisions 
about government revenues (that is, tax rates or federal debt).  
Put differently, although the problem of expertise may dwindle to 
insignificance when one zooms out to the scale of the executive branch 
as a whole, a new problem then looms into view—one of democratic 
accountability. Because the powers to tax, borrow, appropriate, and 
spend are necessarily integrated, one institution should bear the 
 
 179. Michelle Cottle, The Busted, Beleaguered, Broken, Budget Process, ATLANTIC (Apr.  
15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-busted-beleagured-broken-
budget/478416 [https://perma.cc/9Z68-WQG4]. 
 180. Pasachoff, supra note 177, at 2209 (“OMB does the bulk of this work on behalf of the 
President.”). 
 181. See id. at 2227–31 (describing OMB’s role in apportioning funds to agencies). 
 182. See Stith, supra note 113, at 1349 (“If Congress could not prohibit the Executive from 
withdrawing funds from the Treasury, then the constitutional grants of power to the legislature to 
raise taxes and to borrow money would be for naught because the Executive could effectively 
compel such legislation by spending at will.”). 
 183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 184. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 185. Id. art I, §. 8, cls. 1–2; id. amend. XVI.  
 186. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 631–32 (1952) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“The President has no power to raise revenues. That power is in the Congress by 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The President might seize, and the Congress, by 
subsequent action, might ratify the seizure. But, until and unless Congress acted, no 
condemnation would be lawful. The branch of government that has the power to pay 
compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the 
President has effected.” (footnote omitted)).  
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integrated responsibility for exercising those powers.187 But if the 
executive branch can create financial obligations or generate spending 
that Congress has not expressly authorized, then the executive branch 
can take credit for those spending choices while externalizing onto 
Congress the bulk of the political costs associated with immediately or 
eventually funding those decisions.188  
This transfer of political liability might have negligible effects 
where the dollar amounts involved are small. Voters might not be 
sensitive to the small fluctuations in the government’s bank balance or 
to the infinitesimal changes in future tax liabilities that might result 
from agencies spending modest sums in excess of express statutory 
authority.189 But when the sums involved are large—as will be the case 
when the executive branch is using billions of government dollars to 
underwrite broad-scale economic rights—it becomes correspondingly 
more difficult to countenance an arrangement in which one branch can 
reap the political dividends from spending while leaving the other 
branch with the political liabilities of taxing or borrowing to support 
that spending.190  
 
 187. Stith, supra note 113, at 1350 (“Because of the appropriations requirement, it is not 
enough for Congress to direct federal agencies to produce a better world . . . . For the executive 
branch to act to achieve the ends of government identified by Congress, Congress must 
affirmatively authorize the funds to do the job.”). 
 188. The notion that the executive branch will prefer to avoid being seen to make politically 
costly choices about funding draws some support from Professor Daniel Hemel’s recent 
observation that Presidents are reluctant to act unilaterally to increase taxes via administrative 
action, even when they have adequate statutory authority to do so. See Hemel, supra note 19, at 
3 (describing Presidents’ reluctance to “publicly take[] ownership” of “tax-related” decisions by 
the Treasury, especially those that are “taxpayer-unfriendly”); id. at 18–30 (walking through 
several examples of the President choosing to “ask[] Congress for a legislative change rather than 
proceed[ing] through regulation”). 
 189. One might reasonably ask whether the magnitude of the effect should matter. In the 
Tenth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has adopted what amounts to a per se rule against 
certain kinds of laws—commandeering of state officials—that would result in mangled lines of 
political accountability. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“[W]here the 
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt 
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished 
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views 
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
 190. If this argument has a somewhat familiar feel, it is because it is the mirror image of an 
argument often levied against the weakness of the nondelegation doctrine: the contention that 
delegations permit Congress to take credit for enacting aspirational and vague legislation, while 
leaving the executive branch to “pick up the tab” by actually executing those programs. See, e.g., 
Indus. Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“If we are ever to reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Congress itself 
make the critical policy decisions, these are surely the cases in which to do it. . . . It is the hard 
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To some, this accountability concern may seem overblown. Voters 
are not stupid; they may well be capable of discerning when spending 
schemes, particularly large-dollar ones, emanate from executive-
branch choices rather than congressional commands. The President 
himself might wish to take credit for making those choices. Either way, 
the executive branch—or perhaps the party of the President leading 
the executive branch—might be held to answer by voters for the costs 
of large-dollar, broad-scale spending choices.191  
But even if one assumes that voters will correctly attribute such 
choices to the executive branch, it is still difficult to conclude that the 
executive branch possesses a democratic mandate that is comparable 
or equivalent to Congress’s to articulate and advance broad-scale 
spending regimes. It is worth remembering here that economic rights 
mean very different things to different people, and that shielding some 
people’s conceptions of those rights might require dedicating 
government resources in ways that many other people find 
objectionable. Today’s “right to an income” or “right to private 
property” may become tomorrow’s administrative suspension of 
collection of corporate taxes or of taxes on business income192—a 
decision that would effectively create a tax expenditure that Congress 
has not authorized and a hole in the budget that it may not wish to fill. 
Today’s “right to a great job” might become tomorrow’s executive 
order spending billions on a 2000-mile border wall—a wall that 
 
choices, and not the filling in of the blanks, which must be made by the elected representatives of 
the people.”); Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or 
Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46–52 (1982). Here, the worm has turned; through 
interpreting ambiguous statutes to allow for broad-scale spending, the executive branch can reap 
the credit for a spending program, while offloading to Congress the task of paying for it. That 
symmetry, which is perhaps pleasing on an aesthetic level in a “tit for tat” sort of way, doesn’t 
make this (doubled?) dilution of accountability a good idea.  
 191. “Were American parties well-disciplined and ideologically coherent—and of course, 
were Congress and the executive unified by party,” voters could hold parties accountable when, 
for instance, the government incurred large budget deficits. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2342–43 (2006). But because 
political parties are neither well-disciplined nor ideologically coherent—and nor are the branches 
often controlled by the same party (or by ideologically similar factions of the same party)—the 
possibility persists that voters may not reliably hold accountable either the President or his party 
for large-scale spending choices. 
 192. Jeanne Sahadi, How Paul Ryan and Donald Trump Differ on Tax Reform, CNN MONEY 
(JAN. 10, 2017, 12:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/09/pf/taxes/house-tax-reform [https://
perma.cc/7G39-95P5] (explaining that then-President elect Trump wanted to lower the business 
tax rate much more than congressional Republicans). 
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Congress believes will be futile and in any event does not want to pay 
for.193  
The (hypothetical) executive branch underwriting these 
(hypothetical) measures might have a good-faith belief that they will 
enhance citizens’ wealth or increase their economic opportunities—a 
belief not different in kind, perhaps, from the belief that spending 
billions to subsidize health insurance purchases will enhance citizens’ 
welfare or the belief that forgiving tens of billions in loans will increase 
students’ economic opportunity and the nation’s overall prosperity. 
But should the executive branch, even at the behest of the President, 
be able to make these kinds of choices without clear sign-off from 
Congress? Such spending decisions—both the hypothetical ones and 
the actual ones—involve difficult trade-offs about who should bear the 
costs of paying for government benefits, who should derive benefits 
from the government, and what kinds of benefits count as legitimate 
and worthy of public subsidization. Making such society-wide and 
intertemporal redistributive decisions is much less a matter of applying 
apolitical judgment or bureaucratic expertise than it is a matter of 
striking an inherently political bargain about what the government 
must fund and about how much government to fund. The whole point 
of such measures is to redistribute money or resources in a way that 
reshapes the American social contract. From the point of view of 
democratic values—and notwithstanding the existence of quadrennial 
nationwide presidential elections and a “national constituency”194—
surely Congress, warts and all, is still the best forum in which to 
renegotiate that contract.  
 
 193. Manu Raju Deirdre Walsh & David Wright, Trump Asking Congress, Not Mexico, to Pay 
for Border Wall, CNN (Jan. 6, 2017, 2:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/05/politics/border-
wall-house-republicans-donald-trump-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/2PBC-4LTK] (describing 
Trump administration officials’ arguments for why the authority to build such a wall exists and 
where the money might be obtained to pay for it). 
 194. Cf. Kagan, supra note 164, at 2337 n.347 (arguing that increasing presidential control 
should be welcomed because of the “President’s national constituency, and his resulting 
comparative responsiveness to broad public interests”); id. at 2334 (“Bureaucratic action, in 
Mashaw’s view, thus turns out to have a democratic pedigree purer even than Congress’s in our 
system of government.”). But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the 
Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1217, 1232–1246 (2006) (arguing that the President 
actually “cater[s] to a narrower geographic and population constituency than . . . Congress”); 
Peter Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential 
Review of Rule-Making, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 200–01 (1995) (noting that “majority parties in 
Congress have effectively delegated power through the committee system in a way that” leads 
committees to “replicate the dominant policy views of Congress” and thus “dominant public 
opinion”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The project of recognizing and protecting vertical economic rights 
presents a simple and consequential issue of institutional choice. 
Should this task be done by the courts? By Congress alone? By 
agencies, too, but only when Congress is explicit in its delegations and 
appropriations? By agencies, even when Congress is merely ambiguous 
about its intentions in its delegations and appropriations, as long as the 
spending occurs at the direction of the President? 
By pulling on the levers of ambiguous statutory text, the Obama 
administration committed billions of dollars so millions of people could 
access certain economic goods: affordable health insurance and 
affordable higher education. This will surely not be the last time the 
executive branch undertakes such a task. In the vast menagerie of 
federal spending programs, entitlements are like environmental law’s 
“charismatic megafauna”195—big, visible, popular, and hard to leave to 
die—in contrast to the small-fry earmarks and pork-barrel schemes 
that, like the bedeviled snail darter, have had narrower and more easily 
quelled constituencies.196 Because of their widespread appeal, 
entitlement programs are likely to be important to politicians; they may 
form a key plank of a presidential platform or indeed an entire social 
reform movement. As a result, agencies beholden to such politicians 
and sensitive to such political preferences may come to see it as their 
core mission to create and fund these rights—and that, in turn, may 
lead the executive branch to take interpretive liberties in order to 
secure them, if Congress stands in its way. 
Drawing on two case studies, this Article has argued that there are 
serious reasons to doubt whether, in this domain, the executive branch 
should be afforded the leeway regularly accorded to it by 
administrative law. These agencies may have acted in a way that 
aligned with many voters’ preferences and in a way that increased the 
economic security and opportunity of millions of Americans. But, as 
these examples also make apparent, this type of agency action can 
undercut Congress’s control over matters of resource allocation and 
long-term spending. These agency spending decisions can also be 
 
 195. See Sharon Peterson, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the 
Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 479 & n.153 (1999).  
 196. In recent years, Congress has taken steps to ban earmarks. See Deirdre Walsh & Ted 
Barrett, Ryan Slams Brakes Hard on Vote to Bring Back Earmarks, CNN (Nov. 16, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/16/politics/house-republicans-earmarks [https://perma.cc/7ADS-DB 
E9]. 
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accomplished with little transparency and without the checks of judicial 
review, and can unilaterally cause policy entrenchment. It is not clear 
whether or how this needle can be threaded. More work will be 
necessary to conceptualize and create the requisite checks on this 
highly consequential form of executive-branch action. 
 
